Edmonds v Lawson

A barrister’s pupillage may constitute a binding contract between the pupil and the members of chambers. The parties’ intention to create legal relations is assessed objectively in its practical and regulatory context. The pupil supplies consideration by entering a close and potentially productive relationship from which chambers may recruit tenants.

Pupillage is not, however, a contract of apprenticeship where the pupil undertakes no obligation to serve or work for the trainers beyond activities conducive to the pupil’s own professional development. Nor is the pupil a statutory worker merely because work is occasionally performed for a barrister who, when receiving professional services, is the pupil’s client.

A pupil barrister accepted an offer of an unfunded 12-month pupillage in criminal chambers. During her first six months she undertook supervised training. After obtaining a provisional practising certificate, she also worked on her own account and received £150 for one item of work performed for a member of chambers.

Sullivan J held that she was entitled to the national minimum wage. The members of chambers appealed. The pupil cross-appealed against the rejection of her alternative argument under section 54(3)(b) of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998.

The central questions were whether the pupillage arrangement was contractual and, if so, whether it made the pupil a worker under a contract of apprenticeship or another contract for the personal performance of work or services.

1. Appeal allowed and cross-appeal dismissed. In the joint judgment of the court, the pupil had made a legally binding contract with the members of chambers, but she was not a worker within the National Minimum Wage Act 1998.

2. Intention to create legal relations is determined objectively, with close attention to context. A formally offered and accepted pupillage carried major professional and practical consequences for both sides. Its educational character, the availability of professional discipline and the absence of a detailed written agreement did not prevent contractual intention. The professional rules and guidance governing pupillage were impliedly incorporated and sufficiently identified the parties’ functions and obligations.

3. The pupil supplied consideration to chambers even though she neither paid a fee nor promised to perform services for individual pupil-masters. Chambers had a legitimate interest in attracting able pupils and maintaining a pool from which tenants might be recruited. The pupil therefore supplied consideration by agreeing to enter the close and potentially productive relationship which pupillage involved.

4. A contract of apprenticeship, or a modern equivalent extending to a learned profession, is a reciprocal contract. The master undertakes to educate and train the apprentice, while the apprentice undertakes to serve and work for the master and to obey reasonable directions. Although section 54(2) contemplated oral and implied contracts and therefore called for a relatively untechnical approach, those reciprocal obligations remained cardinal features.

5. The pupillage contract lacked the required obligation of service. The pupil was obliged only to undertake activities conducive to her own education and professional development. Work of real value for a barrister attracted a separate professional duty of remuneration. The historic absence of wages for pupils and their freedom to practise for their own benefit during the second six months reinforced the conclusion that pupillage was not apprenticeship or its equivalent.

6. The section 54(3)(b) alternative also failed. The contract did not require the pupil to perform work or services for members of chambers. Where she separately undertook remunerated professional work for a barrister, that barrister was her client for the purposes of her professional practice.

1. Court of Appeal: Allowed the defendants’ appeal, dismissed the claimant’s cross-appeal and held that the claimant was not a worker within the National Minimum Wage Act 1998. Permission to appeal was refused.

2. High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Sullivan J held on 24 September 1999 that the claimant was entitled to receive the national minimum wage during her pupillage. No citation is stated in the judgment.