Minchin v Sheffield City Council

Section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996 does not require the accommodation lost to be the accommodation occupied when the deliberate conduct occurred. The relevant question is whether deliberate conduct caused the person to cease occupying accommodation available for occupation which it would have been reasonable to continue occupying. Imprisonment, followed by non-payment of rent and loss of later accommodation, may satisfy that causal requirement.

The appellant lost a six-month shorthold assured tenancy after being imprisoned for offences committed while she occupied earlier council accommodation. The local authority found her intentionally homeless under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996. Her review failed, and His Honour Judge Bowers dismissed her appeal in the Sheffield County Court.

The central issue was whether section 191(1) required the accommodation lost to be the accommodation occupied when the relevant conduct occurred. A further submission concerning section 191(2) was withdrawn.

The appeal was dismissed unanimously. Lord Justice Henry gave the principal judgment. Lord Justice Aldous agreed, and Lord Justice Schiemann agreed and added brief observations.

1. Section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996 applies where a person deliberately does or fails to do something which causes them to cease occupying accommodation available for their occupation and which it would have been reasonable for them to continue occupying. Its wording contains no requirement that the accommodation lost must be the accommodation occupied when the deliberate act occurred.
2. The appellant’s offences were deliberate acts. They led to imprisonment, which led to rent not being paid and the subsequent loss of the Pye Bank Road accommodation. That accommodation was reasonably available for her continued occupation. The causal chain therefore satisfied section 191(1), notwithstanding that the offences had been committed while she occupied different accommodation.
3. There was no sufficient policy or justice reason to impose the narrower construction advanced by the appellant. The proposed argument under section 191(2) was withdrawn. The court therefore did not decide whether the criminal conduct had been done in good faith while the appellant was unaware of a relevant fact.
4. Schiemann LJ observed that section 191 is intended to exclude from housing priority those who deliberately engage in conduct which deprives them of the right to occupy premises. The appellant fell within that category. The order was: appeal dismissed; legal aid taxation.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) dismissed the appeal unanimously.
2. Sheffield County Court, before His Honour Judge Bowers, dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the local authority’s intentional-homelessness decision.