Chancery Securities Plc v Collins

Permission to appeal should be refused where the proposed grounds merely invite the appellate court to re-assess evidence which the trial judge was entitled to accept or reject. This includes challenges to witness credibility, expert valuation evidence, comparable transactions and competing analytical methods, absent an identifiable error warranting appellate intervention. A disclosed and tenuous prior professional connection between a judge and a witness does not justify permission where no objection was made at trial and the judgment gives no indication of improper influence. A creditor is not legally required to accept an offer compromising substantial indebtedness for a lesser sum.

Chancery Securities Plc brought possession proceedings concerning residential property and sums due under lending facilities. Mr Collins counterclaimed against Chancery and its Law of Property Act receiver, alleging negligence, breach of duty and misconduct. After a ten-day trial, Etherton J dismissed the counterclaim, finding that none of the allegations had been established.

Mr Collins applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal. He challenged the judge’s treatment of valuation and receiver evidence and alleged that the judge’s previous professional connection with the receiver had affected his judgment. The central issues were whether those complaints disclosed an arguable appellate error or a proper basis for alleging judicial bias.

1. Permission refused. The Court of Appeal, per Lord Justice Jonathan Parker, found no substance in the proposed appeal.
2. The complaints about Mr Shapiro’s valuation evidence involved the trial judge’s assessment of witness reliability and competing expert opinions. Those matters were for the judge who heard the evidence. The judge was entitled to accept Mr Shapiro’s evidence, reject the proposed square-footage and rental-value methodologies, and conclude that the relevant properties had been adequately exposed to the market and sold for proper prices.
3. Arguments based on asking prices, speculative inferences, competing calculations and an alleged development profit did not provide a proper basis for appellate intervention. The same applied to the complaints about Mr Villiers. The judge had formed a favourable view of his competence, precision and honesty. A particular lapse had not caused the alleged delay, and the judge found his decisions concerning drawings, planning permission and a management-company structure reasonable.
4. There was no legal duty on Chancery to accept Mr Collins’s offer to compromise his total indebtedness, including interest, by payment of a lesser sum.
5. The alleged judicial connection with Mr Villiers was disclosed at the outset and appeared tenuous and indirect. Mr Collins made no objection to the judge continuing. There was also nothing in the judgment indicating that the connection had influenced the judge. The allegation therefore disclosed no arguable basis for an appeal.

Order: Application for permission to appeal refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal from the order of Etherton J was refused.
• High Court of Justice, Chancery Division: Etherton J dismissed Mr Collins’s counterclaim after trial.