Her Majesty's Attorney-General v Oakes

Where an application has become stale and repeated adjournments have caused delay, the court may nevertheless adjourn if a short further delay is likely to assist a fair and effective determination. Relevant considerations include the volume and history of the papers, the parties’ previous lack of legal representation, the benefit of focused advice and submissions, and any practical prejudice to other parties. The court may weigh inconvenience caused by continuing interim obstacles against the absence of an immediate transaction or other urgent prejudice. An adjournment may be appropriate where counsel’s assistance is likely to benefit both the parties and the court.

Mr Oakes sought permission to appeal against an order made on 15 February 2000 on the Attorney-General’s application under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. Mrs Oakes sought permission to appeal, and an extension of time, in relation to earlier orders, with possible further applications also mentioned. Mr Ashton, instructed for both, applied for the listed matters to be adjourned and not relisted before 1 July 2001 so that he could review the extensive papers, advise on prospects, and prepare the case. The trustee in bankruptcy opposed the application, relying on delay and inconvenience caused by a caution affecting property. The central issue was whether a further adjournment would assist the fair and efficient determination of the applications despite the history of delay.

The court granted Mr Ashton’s application and adjourned the listed matters for hearing during the period in July when Lord Justice Mummery and Sir Martin Nourse were sitting together. Costs were reserved to the adjourned application.

1. Balancing delay and effective assistance. Although the matter was stale, had continued for years, and had been adjourned previously, a further adjournment of about six weeks was justified. The court considered that counsel should have an opportunity to master the voluminous papers and advise both applicants on the prospects of success.
2. Fairness and representation. Mrs Oakes had not been represented at the hearings leading to the orders she wished to challenge, and Mr Oakes had not been represented at the Attorney-General’s section 42 application. Obtaining counsel’s opinion before the applications were considered was therefore likely to benefit the applicants and assist the court.
3. Practical prejudice. The trustee relied on inconvenience caused by the caution registered over the Doncaster property. However, there was no present purchaser and the trustee was not immediately able to dispose of the property. That prejudice did not outweigh the likely benefit of a properly prepared hearing.
4. Directions. The applicants were directed to send the legal-aid amendment documentation to the trustee’s solicitors and the Civil Appeals Office when available, and efforts were to be made to list the matter before the two judges sitting together in July.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Applications for permission to appeal and an extension of time were listed. The court adjourned them for a further hearing in July; costs were reserved.