Ingram v Woodhouse

A driver who sees a pedestrian in the carriageway must respond as a reasonably competent driver would in the circumstances. Where the driver has sufficient visibility and distance to stop, failing to brake promptly may constitute negligence, even if the speed was not unsafe in itself. The assessment must not be artificially heightened by hindsight. A pedestrian’s choice of crossing point is not necessarily negligent where each available point presents significant dangers. However, the manner of crossing may amount to contributory negligence where an adult pedestrian fails to exercise the great care required by a dangerous manoeuvre. Liability is apportioned according to the parties’ respective responsibility.

The claimant was injured when struck by the defendant’s car while crossing a narrow, winding road without pavements. The Exeter County Court, in a judgment given by Mr Recorder Gardner on 16 August 2000, held the defendant solely liable. The defendant appealed, contending that her speed and evasive steering were reasonable and that the claimant should bear responsibility for crossing at that location and in that manner. The central issues were whether the defendant had acted negligently after seeing the claimant and whether the claimant’s conduct amounted to contributory negligence.

Sir Murray Stuart-Smith gave the first judgment. Lord Justice Schiemann agreed with both the conclusion and the reasoning. The appeal was allowed in part.

1. Primary liability. The defendant had approximately 50 metres of visibility and could have stopped shortly before, or approximately at, the point of impact by promptly applying heavy braking. Although travelling at about 40 miles per hour was not unsafe per se, it left little time for reflection and required an effective emergency response. The defendant’s unsupported assumption that the claimant would return to the verge, followed by steering across the road rather than braking, was not the reaction of a reasonably competent driver. The finding of primary liability was upheld.
2. Crossing point. The claimant’s decision to cross where the south-side verge disappeared was not unreasonable. Alternative crossing points involved comparable or different dangers, including walking with her back to approaching traffic and limited visibility around a bend.
3. Manner of crossing. The claimant knew that crossing was dangerous but did not take either of the sensible precautions identified by the court: ensuring that traffic was clear and crossing swiftly, or entering only far enough to assess approaching traffic and retreat if necessary. Her decision to pause and proceed on a collision course fell below the standard expected of an adult pedestrian and contributed to the accident.
4. Apportionment and order. Responsibility was assessed at 70 per cent for the defendant and 30 per cent for the claimant. The appeal was allowed in part, with the specified costs and legal-aid assessment directions.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal allowed in part. The defendant remained primarily liable, but the claimant was found 30 per cent contributorily negligent.
• Exeter County Court: Mr Recorder Gardner held the defendant solely to blame in judgment given on 16 August 2000.