Case details
Summary
Participants in a competitive sport owe one another a duty to take the care that is reasonable in all the circumstances of the contest. The circumstances include the sport’s object, inherent dangers, rules, customs, pace, pressures, and the skill and judgment reasonably expected of participants.
The threshold for liability is high in a fast-moving contest. An error of judgment, oversight or momentary lapse of a kind that a participant might reasonably commit does not establish negligence. Something more serious is required, although recklessness is not a legal prerequisite.
A breach of sporting rules is relevant to reasonableness but does not determine civil liability. Regulatory discipline and liability in negligence serve distinct purposes.
Factual background
A professional jockey suffered catastrophic injuries after another horse moved across his path during a hurdle race. Two fellow jockeys had taken an inside line without checking that another runner was sufficiently far behind. The race stewards found them guilty of careless riding and imposed short suspensions.
Holland J dismissed the injured jockey’s personal injury claim. He found lapses of care but held that they were ordinary errors of judgment arising in the cut and thrust of serious horse racing and did not amount to negligence.
The claimant appealed, arguing that the judge had effectively required proof of reckless disregard and had set the standard of care too low. The Court of Appeal considered the proper negligence standard between participants in competitive sport and the significance of a breach of the sport’s rules.
Held
Appeal dismissed unanimously. Tuckey LJ delivered the leading judgment. Judge LJ gave a concurring judgment, and the Lord Chief Justice agreed with both.
Participants in competitive sport owe one another a duty to take reasonable care in the particular circumstances. The practical content of that duty depends upon the nature and demands of the sporting activity. Tuckey LJ applied Condon v Basi [1985] 1 WLR 866 and Smoldon v Whitworth (1997) ELR 249.
The judge had correctly distinguished legal principle from the practical evidential burden. Given the speed, pressures, inherent dangers and competitive purpose of horse racing, the threshold for liability was high. A claimant need not establish recklessness, but an error of judgment, oversight or lapse of which any participant might be guilty during a fast-moving contest does not suffice. Something more serious is required.
The respondents should have checked that the inside line was clear. Their failure was nevertheless a momentary misjudgment during the closing stages of a close race. Such crossing incidents occurred with some frequency, and the exceptional feature was the seriousness of the claimant’s injury. Holland J was entitled to find that the conduct did not cross the threshold into negligence.
The stewards’ finding of careless riding was relevant but not determinative. Sporting rules and disciplinary findings are considerations in assessing reasonable care, but their weight depends upon the circumstances. A regulatory breach may therefore exist without civil liability in negligence.
The order was that the appeal be dismissed, with the respondents’ costs payable as determined by a Costs Judge.
The court’s approach to earlier authorities
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Appellate history
- Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The court unanimously dismissed the claimant’s appeal and upheld the conclusion that negligence had not been established.
- High Court, Queen’s Bench Division, Manchester District Registry: Holland J dismissed the personal injury claim. He found lapses of care by the defendants but held that they did not amount to breaches of their duty of care.
Lower court decision
Key cases cited
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Cases citing this case
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