Cameron v Royal School, Hampstead

Permission to appeal should be refused where the proposed appeal has no real prospect of success and no other compelling reason justifies allowing it to proceed. A party is not entitled to suspend bankruptcy proceedings indefinitely merely because other applications or challenges remain outstanding. Where repeated applications and attempts to reopen concluded decisions amount to a serious abuse of the court’s process, the court may impose a Grepe v Loam order requiring prior permission for further applications and may refer the matter to the Attorney General for consideration under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981.

The applicant sought permission to appeal from an order of Rimer J refusing to stay bankruptcy proceedings and restrain advertisement of a bankruptcy order made in 1999. She also sought an adjournment so that other outstanding applications could be heard, including applications concerning costs and challenges to the bankruptcy. The court refused the adjournment and considered whether there was any real prospect of success or other compelling reason for an appeal.

1. Adjournment. The application was listed for hearing and the proliferation of applications provided no proper basis for postponing it. The applicant had repeatedly sought to revive or defer matters that had already been considered or were incapable of affecting the bankruptcy order.
2. Permission to appeal. The court found no justification for alleging that Rimer J had failed to consider the relevant facts or erred in exercising his discretion. The applicant’s position appeared to be that the bankruptcy should remain indefinitely inoperative while proceedings challenging it continued. That approach was rejected. There was no real prospect of success on the proposed appeal and no other compelling reason for it to proceed.
3. Abuse of process. The repeated applications, attempts to reopen final decisions and use of adjournments had reached the point of constituting a serious abuse of the court’s process. Court time and the interests of other litigants were relevant considerations.
4. Protective order and referral. The court made a Grepe v Loam order in relation to the bankruptcy proceedings. Further applications or steps in the Court of Appeal or any court below required prior leave from a High Court judge of the Chancery Division. Any application for leave was to be made without notice in writing and dealt with on paper. Documents served without leave would not require the recipient to attend and the application would stand dismissed. The papers were sent to the Attorney General for consideration of proceedings under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981.
5. Order: application dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): refused an adjournment, refused permission to appeal from Rimer J’s order, made a Grepe v Loam order, and referred the papers to the Attorney General.
• Chancery Division: Rimer J refused the application for a stay of the bankruptcy proceedings and restraint of advertisement of the bankruptcy order.