Dolan (t/a Vincent & Sons) v Al-Timimi

On a second-tier appeal, permission requires an important point of practice or principle, or some other compelling reason. A complaint that the first-instance judge preferred one witness’s evidence over another’s is ordinarily a question of fact, not an error of law, even where the losing party alleges fabricated or tampered documents. The appellate court does not conduct a complete rehearing merely to reconsider factual findings. An offensive remark made after judgment, although it should be reprimanded if made in the judge’s hearing, does not ordinarily affect the validity of the judgment already delivered.

The claimant brought proceedings in the Willesden County Court for payment for plumbing work. The district judge awarded him £80 plus £70 costs and dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim on 7 August 2000. The defendant’s appeal to His Honour Judge Krikler was dismissed on 26 September 2000.

The defendant then sought permission to bring a further appeal. He argued that the earlier appeal had not been properly heard, that documents had been fabricated or tampered with, and that remarks allegedly made after judgment created a basis for challenging the decision. The central issues were whether there was an arguable error of law or denial of an appeal, and whether the alleged post-judgment remarks could affect the judgment.

1. Permission refused. Lord Justice Dyson held that the defendant had not been denied an appeal. The circuit judge had heard his complaints and explained that a rehearing was inappropriate where the complaints concerned facts rather than legal error.
2. The underlying dispute concerned the reasonable price payable on a quantum meruit. The district judge had decided a short question of fact by assessing the parties’ evidence. The allegation that documents had been tampered with might bear on that factual assessment, but did not convert the issue into one of law. The defendant had expressly accepted before the circuit judge that he was alleging no error of law.
3. Because the proposed appeal was a second-tier appeal, permission depended on showing an important point of practice or principle, or some other compelling reason. The defendant had no real prospect of establishing that the circuit judge was wrong.
4. Assuming that the claimant made the offensive remark attributed to him after judgment, and that the judge responded with the words alleged, the response did not endorse the remark. The judge should have reprimanded the claimant if the remark had been made in his hearing. Nevertheless, the incident occurred after judgment and could not affect the validity of the judgment already given.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission for a further appeal was refused.
• Willesden County Court, His Honour Judge Krikler: The defendant’s appeal from the district judge’s decision was dismissed on 26 September 2000.
• Willesden County Court, District Judge Morris: Judgment was given for the claimant in the sum of £80, with £70 costs, and the defendant’s counterclaim was dismissed on 7 August 2000.