Heathrow Airport Limited v Roy B Stacey

On an application for permission to appeal, the appellate court reviews whether the lower judge could reasonably reach the decision reached. It does not substitute its own view merely because the applicant seeks reconsideration of the merits. A history of breaching airport byelaws and injunctions may justify continuing an injunction restricting access, particularly where the injunction provides more effective enforcement. Recent compliance, concern about false accusations, and a wish to obtain employment do not themselves establish an appealable error. The court should not promise when an injunction may be discharged, although prolonged observance may eventually make indefinite continuation difficult to justify, potentially subject to safeguards.

The applicant had long been prohibited by airport byelaws from entering Heathrow Airport and had repeatedly breached resulting injunctions. A final injunction restrained him from entering the airport’s curtilage except as a bona fide passenger. Bell J refused his later application to discharge it on the basis of the injunction’s greater effectiveness and his history of non-compliance. The applicant sought permission to appeal, relying on his recent compliance, the risk of false attribution of breaches, prospective chauffeur employment, and an alleged breach of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The central issue was whether Bell J had made an appealable error or whether the applicant was merely seeking a different exercise of judgment.

Lord Justice Kay refused permission to appeal.

1. Appellate function. The Court of Appeal’s task was to review the process by which Bell J reached his decision and to determine whether he could reasonably have reached it. It was not the court’s function to reconsider the matter and substitute its own view. The applicant sensibly accepted that he could not show that Bell J was wrong, but sought a fresh assessment instead.
2. Continuation of the injunction. Bell J was entitled to take into account that the airport byelaws were frequently flouted and imposed only fines, whereas breach of the injunction could lead to imprisonment. He was also entitled to regard the applicant’s long history of breaching the byelaws and injunctions as providing good grounds for fearing renewed non-compliance. The applicant’s period without a proved breach, proposed employment, and concern about being falsely identified did not disclose any sufficient basis for an appeal.
3. Possible future discharge. Kay LJ gave no timetable or assurance. He observed, without deciding the issue, that if the applicant observed the injunction over a prolonged period, it would be difficult to justify continuing it indefinitely. In time, the airport authority might have to recognise that he should be permitted to undertake chauffeur work, potentially subject to restrictions. Those observations provided no guarantee as to when discharge might occur.

The application was refused. This avoided further costs which the applicant would inevitably have been unable to justify.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): permission to appeal refused.
2. High Court, Queen’s Bench Division (Bell J): on 27 March 2001, refused the applicant’s application to discharge the continuing injunction.