Islam v London Pension Fund Authority

Questions concerning whether it was reasonably practicable to present an unfair-dismissal complaint in time are principally questions of fact for the employment tribunal. The Employment Appeal Tribunal and Court of Appeal are concerned with errors of law, not with re-evaluating those factual conclusions. In racial-discrimination proceedings, the tribunal has a broad discretion to extend time where it considers it just and equitable to do so. Extremely stale proceedings may properly be refused where a fair trial is no longer possible or proceedings were not commenced within a reasonable period. A tribunal that directs itself correctly and acts within its discretion commits no error of law merely because the claimant advances medical, family or other personal reasons for delay.

The applicant had been employed by the Inner London Education Authority and was dismissed in 1990 after the authority ceased to exist. In 1999, he commenced proceedings alleging unfair dismissal, unlawful indirect racial discrimination and conspiracy arising from events substantially earlier.

The employment tribunal rejected the claims as out of time. The Employment Appeal Tribunal upheld that approach, finding that it had been reasonably practicable for the applicant to institute proceedings earlier and that the discrimination proceedings had not been brought within a reasonable time. The applicant applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal, alleging errors of law in the Employment Appeal Tribunal’s treatment of limitation and delay.

1. Application dismissed. The application for permission to appeal had no sound basis.
2. For unfair dismissal, whether it was reasonably practicable to present the complaint within the statutory period is largely a question of fact for the employment tribunal. The Employment Appeal Tribunal correctly recognised that its jurisdiction was confined to errors of law and that the issue was principally for the tribunal: see Palmer v Southend Borough Council [1984] ICR 372.
3. The applicant’s explanations included hypertension, medical advice, difficulties following the birth of his first child, possession proceedings concerning his home and attempts to recover holiday pay. Those matters did not prevent him from instituting proceedings and seeking an adjournment so that they could be considered. The tribunal was entitled to find that it had been reasonably practicable to commence proceedings earlier.
4. The claims were exceptionally stale. Even if it had not been reasonably practicable to commence the proceedings within the initial period, they were not brought within a reasonable time. After approximately ten years, a fair trial of the events was impossible.
5. In relation to racial discrimination, the tribunal had a broad discretion under section 68 of the Race Relations Act 1976 to decide whether it was just and equitable to extend time. The Employment Appeal Tribunal correctly directed itself and concluded that the tribunal had acted well within that discretion.
6. There was therefore no error of law warranting appellate intervention. Order: application for permission to appeal dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): application for permission to appeal dismissed.
• Employment Appeal Tribunal: upheld the employment tribunal’s conclusions that the unfair-dismissal complaint could have been instituted in time and that the racial-discrimination claim was not brought within a reasonable period.
• Employment tribunal: rejected the stale claims as out of time.