Khan v Khan

Permission for a second-tier appeal is confined to cases raising an important point of principle or practice, or presenting another compelling reason. A challenge alleging that an earlier judgment was procured by fraud is exceptional. It requires properly particularised allegations connected to the result. A claim may be struck out where the alleged matters did not affect the earlier decision, are wholly unparticularised, or are time-barred. Dissatisfaction with an earlier outcome cannot, by itself, justify reopening the dispute.

Nasrullah Khan sought permission to appeal against His Honour Judge Neligan’s decision of 2 February 2001, which upheld District Judge Frenkel’s order striking out his claim. The claim was brought against his former wife and two other defendants and alleged that false evidence had caused loss in ancillary relief proceedings concluded in 1994. The County Court proceedings had themselves followed an earlier appeal from District Judge Frenkel’s decision. The central issues were whether the claim disclosed reasonable grounds and whether the proposed second-tier appeal met the required threshold.

Lord Justice Rix refused permission to appeal.

1. A second-tier appeal could be permitted only if it raised an important point of principle or practice, or if there was some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it. Neither requirement was satisfied.
2. A complaint that an earlier judgment was procured by fraud could succeed only in the rarest cases. The ancillary relief order had not depended on findings of conduct. It had been based on the parties’ circumstances and their financial needs. The applicant had already advanced his conspiracy allegations during the original proceedings and had failed on them.
3. The new claim was wholly unparticularised. No specific false evidence was identified. The allegations concerning the condition of the matrimonial home appeared to have played no part in either the original decision or the judgment on appeal. Any possible complaint was also more than six years old and time-barred.
4. The claim therefore disclosed no reasonable grounds for bringing the proceedings. The strike-out under CPR 3.4 was upheld. The formal order was: application for permission to appeal refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): refused permission for a second-tier appeal.
• Bristol County Court, His Honour Judge Neligan: on 2 February 2001, upheld District Judge Frenkel’s strike-out of the claim.
• Bristol County Court, District Judge Frenkel: on 30 November 2000, struck out the claim as disclosing no reasonable grounds.