Jameson v Smith, Personal Representative Of & Anor

Case management orders should not be reopened merely because a later judge would have exercised the discretion differently. They should be varied only where there has been a real, normally significant, change of circumstances, while retaining the flexibility required by the overriding objective.

Procedural appeal routes are substantive safeguards of finality and certainty. A litigant should not reargue an interlocutory issue at a later case management hearing and then invite the Court of Appeal to exercise first-instance discretion. Fresh evidence on appeal requires permission under Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 52.11(2)(b), and the principles in Ladd v Marshall apply. Evidence that could have been obtained earlier should not be admitted.

The claimant brought a personal injury claim arising from a serious road traffic accident. Quantum was the only issue in dispute.

A district judge refused permission for the claimant to rely on separate neuropsychological, neuropsychiatric and care evidence instead of the single joint experts. Andrew Smith J dismissed the claimant’s appeal against those orders. The claimant did not seek permission to appeal further.

At a later case management conference, His Honour Judge Bryant refused to reopen the decisions. The claimant appealed to the Court of Appeal, seeking permission to rely on new expert reports and to revisit the earlier restrictions. The central issues were whether the orders could properly be changed and whether the new evidence should be admitted.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal upheld the case management orders and ordered the claimant to pay the respondents’ costs.
2. Per Laws LJ, consistency, finality and certainty are important features of case management. A later judge should alter earlier procedural directions only where there has been a true, ordinarily significant, change of circumstances, or where an eventuality contemplated in the earlier decision has occurred. The overriding objective remains relevant, but does not justify repeated reconsideration of the same arguments.
3. The claimant’s applications had already been considered by the district judge and by Andrew Smith J. The later hearing was, in substance, an attempt to treat the first-instance court as an appellate court and then to invite the Court of Appeal to assume a first-instance case management role. That approach was improper and would undermine the appeal procedures, producing repetition, delay and wasted costs.
4. The reports obtained shortly before the appeal were fresh evidence. Permission was required under Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 52.11(2)(b). The principles in Ladd v Marshall applied in substance. There was no proper basis for admitting the material because there was no reason to suppose that it could not have been obtained for the hearing before Judge Bryant.
5. Simon Brown LJ agreed that the appeal was misconceived. The attempt to challenge the established use of single joint experts, combined with the unpermissioned fresh reports, provided additional reasons for dismissal.
6. Miss Booth’s later withdrawal as care expert was a changed circumstance requiring consideration at the forthcoming case management hearing, but that issue was for the judge below and not for determination on this appeal.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): appeal dismissed with costs.
• High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Andrew Smith J dismissed the appeal from the district judge’s case management orders on 12 October 2000 and refused permission for a further appeal.
• District Judge: District Judge Brougham refused permission for additional neuropsychological, neuropsychiatric and care evidence at a case management hearing on 24 May 2000.
• High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: His Honour Judge Bryant refused to reopen the earlier orders at a case management conference on 13 March 2001.