HM Attorney General v Oakes

Under Supreme Court Act 1981, s 42, an indefinite civil proceedings order is the usual form. A specified duration remains discretionary and is required only where the circumstances justify it. The order restrains the litigant, directly or indirectly, including through servants or agents; naming a company as a possible agent does not itself restrain the company or require the corporate veil to be pierced. A certificate by the Solicitor General authorising the application is sufficient evidence of proper law-officer authorisation and consideration. Permission to appeal should be refused where the proposed grounds have no real prospect of success.

The Divisional Court granted the Attorney General’s application for a civil proceedings order against Arthur Oakes under s 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. The order prohibited him from instituting or continuing civil proceedings, or making applications in such proceedings, without High Court permission. It referred to Townsend Investments Incorporated as one of his servants or agents.

Mr Oakes was refused permission to appeal below. The Court of Appeal considered an application for permission to appeal and an extension of time. The proposed grounds concerned the indefinite duration of the order, the reference to Townsend Investments Incorporated, and alleged lack of personal authorisation by the Attorney General or Solicitor General.

1. Application refused. The proposed appeal had no real prospect of success. The Court also refused the associated application for an extension of time.
2. Section 42(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 gives the court discretion to make an order for a specified period, but otherwise provides that the order remains in force indefinitely. The statutory structure indicates that an indefinite order is the normal form. The Divisional Court had considered the seriousness of restricting access to the courts and the safeguard supplied by the leave requirement in s 42(3). An applicant may obtain leave by showing an arguable and apparently bona fide claim which has not already been litigated directly or indirectly.
3. The reference to Townsend Investments Incorporated did not prohibit that company from bringing proceedings in its own right. It addressed proceedings instituted by Mr Oakes directly or indirectly, including through a servant or agent such as the company. The issue of piercing the corporate veil therefore did not arise.
4. The certificate stating that the Solicitor General authorised the application was clear and satisfactory evidence of authorisation. Authorisation necessarily implied sufficient consideration of what was being authorised. The court saw no reason to doubt that the Solicitor General acted within the authority of his deputyship under s 1 of the Law Officers' Act 1944.
5. An appeal against a refusal of permission to appeal given in open court was not available. The proposed subpoena applications and the suggested review under s 375 of the Insolvency Act 1986 also had no prospect of success on the material before the court.

• Divisional Court: granted a civil proceedings order against Mr Oakes on 15 February 2000, amended 21 February 2000, under s 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. Permission to appeal was refused.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): refused permission to appeal and the application for an extension of time on 19 July 2001. The order under appeal remained in force.