Petrides v Direct Line Group Services

An appellate court reviewing an employment tribunal’s interlocutory case-management decision may intervene only for an error of law. Regulation 4 of the Employment Tribunal's Regulations 1993 confers a discretion to require particulars, witnesses or documents. Requests must concern relevant and necessary evidence. The power should not generate unnecessary material, expense, disruption or delay. Permission should be refused where the proposed appeal merely challenges the exercise of that discretion and has no real prospect of success.

Mr Petrides sought permission to appeal after the Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed his appeal against interlocutory directions made by the Bedford Employment Tribunal in preparation for his unfair-dismissal hearing. The tribunal ordered limited salary and telephone information and an attempt to identify a computer screen, but refused wider requests for ten witnesses and further documents. Mr Petrides alleged errors of law, relied on Article 6 of the Convention on Human Rights, and argued that the material was necessary to establish his case. The central issue was whether the tribunal had misconstrued Regulation 4 of the Employment Tribunal's Regulations 1993 or exercised its discretion perversely.

Disposition

Permission to appeal was refused. The proposed appeal had no real prospect of success.

1. Appellate jurisdiction. An appeal from an Employment Tribunal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal lies only on a point of law. The Court of Appeal may intervene in an interlocutory case-management decision only where the tribunal misconstrued the scope of its powers or exercised its discretion perversely, meaning that it reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal properly understanding the issues could have reached.
2. Regulation 4 discretion. Regulation 4 uses discretionary language. The tribunal may require particulars, the attendance of witnesses or disclosure of documents. The tribunal itself is generally best placed to exercise that discretion because it knows the issues requiring determination.
3. Relevant and necessary evidence. Oral and documentary evidence should be confined to material relevant to the issues. Disclosure should not be ordered where it is not essential to the just disposal of the case. The power should not be exercised so as to create unnecessary documents or evidence, expense or delay.
4. Application to the requests. The chairman was entitled to refuse the wider disclosure sought because it was not shown to be essential. The relevance of the proposed witnesses had not been established. Their attendance appeared principally intended to facilitate cross-examination, and compelling them would cause disruption. The limited information already ordered did not justify the additional documents and witnesses sought.
5. The Bedford tribunal had made no error of law and had not acted perversely. The Employment Appeal Tribunal was therefore entitled to dismiss the appeal, and the Court of Appeal refused permission.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): refused permission to appeal from the Employment Appeal Tribunal.
• Employment Appeal Tribunal: dismissed Mr Petrides’ appeal against the interlocutory decision of the Bedford Employment Tribunal.
• Bedford Employment Tribunal: made limited case-management directions but refused wider orders for witnesses and documents.