Sutton v Parking Adjudicator

On a renewed application for permission to appeal in judicial review proceedings, the Court of Appeal must form its own view of whether there is an arguable case. It is not bound by the first-instance refusal, although it should consider the reasons given.

A judge determining permission need not rehearse every issue previously debated. The question is whether an arguable case for judicial review has been established. Judicial review proceedings should be brought promptly, and the public interest in priority may justify refusing a late attempt to enlarge their scope. Where Parliament has provided procedures for parking enforcement and appeals, the existence of those procedures did not make arguable breaches of Convention rights under articles 6(1) or 13.

Anthony Sutton sought permission to appeal against Turner J’s refusal of permission to apply for judicial review of decisions made by the Parking Adjudicator and the Parking Appeal Service. Permission had previously been refused on the papers by Jackson J.

The underlying dispute concerned a penalty charge notice, an unsuccessful appeal, and unsuccessful applications for review. The applicant challenged the extent to which Turner J had considered his grounds, the reasons given for the Parking Appeal Service decision, the refusal to amend the judicial review application, and the compatibility of the statutory parking enforcement procedures with Convention rights.

1. Application for permission refused. The Court of Appeal was not bound by Turner J’s decision. It was required to form its own view of the merits and determine whether there was an arguable case for permission, while having regard to Turner J’s reasons.
2. Turner J was not required to set out every issue debated before the Parking Appeal Service. His task was to decide whether an arguable case had been shown for a full judicial review. In the circumstances, the court did not criticise the manner in which he dealt with the matter.
3. The proposed amendment based on Moulder v London Borough of Sutton was refused. Judicial review is a public law remedy which should be pursued promptly. There was a strong public interest in priority and prompt determination, and the proceedings had already passed through several stages.
4. The court considered the reasoning issue by reference to Flannery and another v Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd [2001] All ER 373. Turner J was entitled to deal with the matter as he did, having considered how the decision had been reached and how the appeals had been approached. The principle in Flannery and another v Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd did not make an arguable case that the decision was insufficiently reasoned.
5. Having regard to the procedures provided by Parliament under the 1991 Act and regulations made under it, the court could not hold that an arguable breach of article 6(1) or article 13 of the Convention had been shown. Nor did the wider submissions concerning article 1 of the Protocol justify granting permission.

The Parking Appeal Service had adequately considered the case, and its decisions were ones which the decision-makers were entitled to reach and had sufficiently reasoned in the circumstances.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): application for permission to appeal refused on 26 July 2001.
• High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court: Turner J refused permission to apply for judicial review on 7 June 2001.
• High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court: Jackson J had previously refused permission on the papers on 22 December 2000.