Ramirez v Secretary Of State For Home Department

An asylum appeal involving a mentally ill applicant must be determined through a fair, fact-sensitive assessment of the evidence and procedural requirements. There is no automatic entitlement to adjournment because an applicant cannot attend through mental illness. Relevant considerations include the condition and prognosis, the nature of the case, the evidence available in the applicant’s absence, and the likelihood of attendance after an adjournment.

Human-rights objections to removal could not be introduced within this existing asylum appeal because of the transitional operation of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. They could instead be raised with the Secretary of State, who was required to reconsider removal compatibly with Convention rights.

Felipe Ramirez, a Colombian national who arrived in the United Kingdom as a child, claimed asylum and later faced deportation following a criminal conviction. He was detained in a mental hospital and could not attend the special adjudicator’s hearing. His appeal was dismissed, and the Immigration Appeal Tribunal upheld the decision, although the special adjudicator’s reasoning was seriously flawed.

The applicant sought permission to appeal out of time, permission to adduce fresh evidence, and permission to raise Convention rights under Articles 2 and 3. The central issues were whether the hearing should have been adjourned, whether the asylum decision required remission, whether fresh evidence should be admitted, and whether human-rights objections could be determined within the existing appeal.

1. Permission to appeal refused. The special adjudicator had adopted a seriously flawed approach, including treating the applicant’s own evidence as evidentially worthless. Nevertheless, the refusal to grant a further adjournment was not unlawful, and the errors did not require a new hearing on the material then available.
2. There is no right to an adjournment on demand. The decision is fact-sensitive. The special adjudicator must consider the nature and prognosis of the applicant’s condition, the nature of the case, the evidence that will and will not be available in the applicant’s absence, and when, if ever, the applicant is likely to attend. An indefinite adjournment is not required merely because mental illness prevents attendance.
3. An applicant’s written interview record and witness statement remain evidence. Mental illness may require them to be read with caution, but it does not justify disregarding them without adequate analysis.
4. The evidence did not establish persecution for a Convention reason. The applicant’s reliance on Shah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1999] 2 AC 629 and Emilia Gomez v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] INLR 549 could not overcome the absence of evidence connecting the feared persecution with membership of a particular social group or imputed political opinion.
5. Fresh evidence was not admitted. The applicant had received professional representation and had not shown that the proposed material was previously unavailable. In any event, the material was not identified sufficiently to demonstrate a viable basis for remission.
6. Human-rights objections could not be raised within the existing asylum appeal. The temporal effect of section 65 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 prevented that course. Following Pardeepan v Secretary of State for the Home Department, the applicant could raise objections with the Secretary of State and pursue any subsequent statutory appeal or judicial review available.
7. Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 did not give the Court of Appeal original jurisdiction to determine the new human-rights case. The Secretary of State, as a public authority, had to take a genuinely fresh look at implementation of the deportation order, having regard to the applicant’s mental state, family circumstances and conditions in Colombia.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): permission to appeal refused. The court upheld the refusal of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal to disturb the special adjudicator’s decision, while directing that human-rights objections be considered through the alternative procedure described in the judgment.
• Immigration Appeal Tribunal: dismissed the applicant’s appeal and refused permission to appeal.
• Special adjudicator: refused further adjournment and dismissed the asylum appeal.