Zappia Middle East Construction Co Ltd & Anor v Clifford Chance (A Firm)

A solicitor without the necessary right of audience should not ordinarily address the court on behalf of a company. Exceptional permission may be granted only where a good reason is shown. The unavailability of preferred counsel, uncertainty about instructing replacement counsel, and a party’s choice not to arrange other representation do not, without more, justify departure from the court’s normal practice. The court may refuse permission where the party can appear in person, communicate the company’s position, and rely on written submissions without injustice or hardship.

The claimants were pursuing an appeal from an order made by Blofeld J on 23 February 2001. In the pending appeal, Robert Walker LJ had ordered security for the respondents’ costs and the claimants sought an extension of time to comply. The second claimant applied for permission for Mr Sarosh Zaiwalla, the senior partner of the solicitors acting for both claimants, to advocate for the company, although he had no right of audience. The issue was whether the circumstances justified that exceptional permission.

1. Application refused. The Court of Appeal unanimously refused permission for Mr Zaiwalla to appear as advocate for the company.
2. The court’s normal practice is that only a person with a right of audience may address it on behalf of a party. A solicitor without the appropriate certificate must obtain permission at the hearing before representing the company orally.
3. The claimants had not shown a good reason for departing from that practice. Their preferred counsel were unavailable, but they had more than two weeks after learning that the hearing date would not be changed to instruct other counsel or another person with a right of audience.
4. The court treated the absence of suitable representation as the result of the claimants’ choice. Mr Zappia could address the court on his own behalf and, if he wished, speak for the company. The court had also received and considered a detailed skeleton argument prepared by the solicitors.
5. In those circumstances, allowing the solicitor to appear was unnecessary. Adhering to the ordinary rule would cause neither injustice nor hardship.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Refused the application for permission for the company’s solicitor to appear as its advocate in the pending appeal.
2. High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division: Blofeld J made the order appealed from on 23 February 2001.
3. Procedural history in the pending appeal: Permission to appeal was granted by Kay LJ. Robert Walker LJ subsequently ordered security for the respondents’ costs on 5 June 2001.