Walji v Great Ormond Street Hospital

An extension of time for appealing to the Employment Appeal Tribunal is exceptional. It requires a satisfactory explanation for the delay. A pending application to review the tribunal’s decision does not justify delaying an appeal on a point of law. An appellate challenge to the exercise of discretion requires an error of legal principle, failure to consider relevant facts, reliance on irrelevant facts, or a decision that is plainly wrong. The Human Rights Act does not displace reasonable domestic time limits.

Mr Walji brought claims of racial harassment and unfair dismissal against Great Ormond Street NHS Trust. The Employment Tribunal rejected both claims and refused an application for review. His notice of appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal was lodged out of time. The Registrar refused an extension, and Lindsay J dismissed his appeal on 26 April 2001. Mr Walji applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal, alleging mishandling, bias and infringement of his right of appeal. The central issue was whether the refusal to extend time involved an error of principle or was otherwise wrong in law.

Lord Justice Mummery refused permission to appeal. There was no order for costs.

1. The Employment Appeal Tribunal had a discretion to extend the time for appealing, but exercising that discretion was an exceptional step. An extension required a satisfactory explanation for the delay.
2. An appeal against the exercise of such a discretion required the applicant to establish an error of legal principle, failure to appreciate relevant facts, failure to disregard irrelevant facts, or that the decision was plainly wrong.
3. Mr Walji had been informed that the time limit ran from the date of the Employment Tribunal’s reserved decision. He was not entitled to await the outcome of his review application before lodging an appeal on a point of law. The pending review was therefore not a sufficient explanation for the delay.
4. The allegations of prejudice, bias, victimisation and procedural unfairness did not demonstrate that the discretion had been exercised unlawfully or plainly wrongly. The decision accorded with established principles and the proposed appeal had no real prospect of success.
5. The court accepted that the Human Rights Act did not affect the operation of reasonable time limits under English law.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 10 August 2001, permission to appeal was refused. The order refusing an extension of time remained in force.
• Employment Appeal Tribunal: On 26 April 2001, Lindsay J dismissed the appeal against the Registrar’s refusal of an extension of time.
• Employment Appeal Tribunal Registrar: On 23 January 2001, the Registrar refused an extension of time to appeal from the Employment Tribunal.
• Employment Tribunal: The Tribunal rejected the claims of race discrimination and unfair dismissal in reasons sent on 6 October 2000. An application for review was refused on 23 November 2000.