Jayasuriya v Meat Hygiene Service & Anor

A purposive construction of social legislation may extend protection, but it cannot remove an express statutory condition. Section 7 of the Race Relations Act 1976 required a contract worker to be supplied under a contract made with the principal. A statutory inspector appointed under hygiene regulations was not arguably supplied under such a contract merely because the inspector worked daily at the licensed premises, used office facilities, or generated regulatory charges. In the absence of evidence of a supply contract, the licensed premises were not a principal within section 7.

The applicant, an inspector employed by the Meat Hygiene Service, was appointed under statutory hygiene regulations to work at a turkey slaughterhouse operated by Lincs Turkeys Limited. He alleged that employees of the company subjected him to racial taunts and that the company was liable under section 7 of the Race Relations Act 1976, although it was not his employer.

The Nottingham Employment Tribunal held that the company was not a proper respondent because no contract existed between the Meat Hygiene Service and the company for the supply of the inspector. The Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed his appeal. The renewed application concerned the proper construction of section 7, the effect of the correct hygiene regulations, and whether the evidence disclosed that he worked for the company under a contract.

1. Application dismissed. Permission to appeal was refused. The tribunal’s decision that Lincs Turkeys Limited was not a principal within section 7 of the Race Relations Act 1976 could not be impugned.

2. Section 7 was to be construed purposively. Where possible, a construction giving greater protection against discrimination should be preferred. That approach had limits: the court could not ignore the express requirement in section 7(1) that the contract worker be supplied under a contract made with the principal.

3. The relevant question was whether there was arguably a contract under which the Meat Hygiene Service supplied the inspector to the company. The tribunal’s findings showed that he worked under the statutory regulations, remained independent of the company, was controlled by the Meat Hygiene Service or its official veterinary surgeon, and was present because the statutory scheme required an inspector. Those matters did not suggest a contract worker arrangement of the kind found in an employment-agency placement.

4. The correction of the regulations placed before the tribunal made no material difference. The correct regulations permitted the Minister to take account of plant inspection assistants when deciding whether to appoint an inspector, but the appointment still arose from statutory powers and duties. The regulations authorised the inspector’s presence without a contract and made a contractual supply highly unlikely given the public-interest and supervisory nature of the functions.

5. Regulatory charges imposed by the Minister, and consultation concerning the rates, did not indicate a contractual basis for supplying the inspector. Nor could the applicant rely on speculation about undocumented arrangements. If documents or witnesses were considered necessary, they should have been sought before the tribunal.

6. The separate argument that the inspector did not work for the company was immaterial to the renewed application. On a second-tier appeal, the Court of Appeal was principally concerned with whether the tribunal’s decision was right, rather than whether the Employment Appeal Tribunal adopted the correct reasoning.

Order: Permission to appeal refused. Legal aid assessment.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): the renewed application for permission to appeal from the Employment Appeal Tribunal was dismissed; permission to appeal was refused.
• Employment Appeal Tribunal: on 2 February 2001, dismissed the appeal from the Employment Tribunal.
• Nottingham Employment Tribunal: on 25 February 2000, held that Lincs Turkeys Limited was not a proper respondent to the racial-discrimination complaint and dismissed it from the action.