Slinger, R (on the application of) v St Christopher's High School & Ors

[2001] EWCA Civ 1396

Case details

Case citations
[2001] EWCA Civ 1396
Court
Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Judgment date
24 August 2001
Judgment text

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Subjects
Administrative law Judicial review Public law remedies
Keywords
judicial review permission to apply practical utility local ombudsman delay school exclusion undertaking costs
Outcome
application refused
Judicial consideration

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Summary

Permission for judicial review may be refused where the claim cannot provide any practical benefit beyond redress already achieved through an independent investigation and undertakings given by the public bodies concerned. The court should assess the practical effect of any proposed order, rather than treating formal quashing as sufficient in itself. This includes considering whether an order could restore lost opportunities or materially improve the claimant's position. A claimant should not necessarily be penalised for first pursuing a sensible complaint to the local ombudsman, particularly where the ombudsman may identify that the matter is not truly a legal issue.

Factual background

The applicant challenged the permanent exclusion of her son from St Christopher's High School. The headteacher's decision had been upheld by the governing body and an independent appeal committee.

The local ombudsman later found that the exclusion process was procedurally flawed and that the conduct did not justify exclusion. The applicant then sought permission to apply for judicial review, seeking to quash or expunge the school's decision. Moses J refused permission because of delay and because the proceedings could achieve no practical benefit. The Court of Appeal considered whether those reasons were correct.

Held

  1. Application refused. Lord Justice Sedley held that judicial review could achieve no more for the applicant than had already been achieved through the local ombudsman's report and the undertaking given in open court by the headteacher, the governors and the local education authority to keep the report with the pupil's school records.
  2. The court assumed in the applicant's favour that the delay objection could be overcome. Delay incurred while pursuing the ombudsman's investigation should not, for present purposes, be treated as fatal. Resort to the ombudsman was a sensible first step, and judicial review is a remedy of last resort. The court did not finally determine the remaining delay issues.
  3. The decisive consideration was practical utility. A successful judicial review could not restore the two years of schooling already lost, remove the need to explain the events to a new school, or improve materially upon the independent finding that the exclusion had been unfounded. The applicant also faced potentially crippling costs if the claim failed.
  4. The court nevertheless stated that no school would be justified in holding the earlier exclusion against the pupil and that the local education authority should make this clear to its schools. The court directed that the judgment be transcribed at public expense, but concluded that no further judicial remedy was available.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Lord Justice Sedley refused the application for permission to apply for judicial review.
  2. Administrative Court: Moses J had refused permission on grounds of delay and lack of practical benefit.

Lower court decision

Judgment appealed:
Not stated in the judgment
Outcome:
application refused

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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