Rodrigues v Irwin Mitchell (A Firm)

An admission of breach of professional duty does not, by itself, establish liability. The claimant must prove that the breach caused the loss. A finding that the claimant would have acted in the same way even with proper advice defeats causation. The Civil Procedure Rules should generally be observed, but a trial judge may admit material despite non-compliance and has a general discretion over the conduct of the trial. Procedural irregularities do not necessarily make a decision wrong or a hearing unfair. Permission to appeal is refused where the proposed grounds have no real prospect of success.

Mr Rodrigues brought professional negligence proceedings against Irwin Mitchell after his claim against former solicitors, Stanton & Walker, was dismissed for want of prosecution. Irwin Mitchell admitted failing in January 1998 to advise him of the deadline for setting down that action. Gray J dismissed the claim, finding that the admitted breach was not an effective cause of the loss and, alternatively, that Mr Rodrigues was wholly responsible by reason of contributory negligence. Permission to appeal was refused below.

Mr Rodrigues challenged the causation finding, alleged that an earlier court order had been concealed from him, and relied on alleged breaches of procedural rules and unfairness at trial. The central issue was whether the proposed appeal had a real prospect of success.

1. Permission refused. The Court of Appeal, applying the real-prospect-of-success threshold, concluded that the proposed appeal had no real prospect of success. There was no order for costs.
2. Causation in professional negligence. An admitted breach of duty is insufficient to establish liability. The claimant must prove a causal link between the breach and the damage claimed. Gray J had found that the admitted failure to advise Mr Rodrigues of the setting-down deadline did not cause the loss because Mr Rodrigues would not have acted differently even if properly advised.
3. The judge was entitled to draw that conclusion from Mr Rodrigues’s past failure to respond to requests for information, assistance and warnings. The loss resulted from his conduct in prosecuting the underlying claim, rather than from the admitted breach. Gray J’s alternative finding that contributory negligence would have reduced damages by 100 per cent provided a further answer, although the causation finding was sufficient.
4. Earlier order. The alleged failure to disclose District Judge Peters’s order did not provide a real ground of appeal. That order had dismissed the first application to strike out the underlying claim. The later dismissal resulted from the failure to set down the action, not from the outcome of the earlier application. The alleged concealment therefore had no causative impact on the loss claimed against Irwin Mitchell.
5. Procedural irregularities. The Civil Procedure Rules should generally be observed. Nevertheless, a trial judge may admit material despite non-compliance and has a general discretion concerning the conduct of proceedings. Having reviewed Gray J’s detailed reasons, the Court concluded that any late service or other procedural mistakes did not make the decision wrong or the trial unfair.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Mummery LJ refused permission to appeal and made no order for costs.
• Leeds County Court: Gray J dismissed Mr Rodrigues’s professional negligence claim against Irwin Mitchell, entered judgment for the defendant, and refused permission to appeal.