Alexander v Halifax Plc

An appeal from a county court or High Court decision requires permission under section 55(1) of the Administration of Justice Act 1999. Permission may be granted only where the appeal raises an important point of principle or practice, or where another compelling reason exists. A claim relying on Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not disclose an individually enforceable private-law cause of action. Nor does a claimant’s involvement in extensive litigation establish that the defendant infringed any such right by compelling the litigation. Where repeated proceedings amount to an abuse of process, the court may make a Grepe v Loam order restricting further applications without prior permission.

The claimant brought proceedings against Halifax plc, claiming damages for an alleged breach of Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights arising from repeated possession proceedings and related litigation.

A Master struck out the claim. Ebsworth J dismissed the claimant’s appeal on 10 June 1999, holding that Article 25 conferred no individually enforceable right in private law and that the claim had no merit. The claimant sought permission to appeal out of time. The Court of Appeal therefore considered whether section 55(1) of the Administration of Justice Act 1999 permitted a further appeal.

1. Permission threshold. The Court of Appeal held that section 55(1) applied because the claimant had appealed to the High Court and the High Court had decided that appeal. Permission could therefore be granted only if the proposed appeal raised an important point of principle or practice, or if there was another compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it.
2. Article 25. The court accepted the lower court’s conclusion that the question whether Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights conferred an individually enforceable private-law right had long been settled. It saw no reason to entertain an appeal on that issue.
3. No arguable factual basis. Even if the legal issue were debatable, the claimant’s extensive litigation resulted from his own conviction that he had been wronged and his continued pursuit of that belief. It could not reasonably be attributed to any infringement by Halifax of a right under Article 25. The proposed appeal therefore disclosed neither an important point of principle or practice nor any compelling reason.
4. Disposition and restraint. The application for permission to appeal was dismissed. Given the history of repeated litigation and the claimant’s refusal to accept finality, the court made a Grepe v Loam order requiring prior permission before further applications or steps could be taken in the relevant proceedings or in relation to the property. The papers were referred to the Attorney General to consider an application for a restraint order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. There was no order as to costs.

• Queen’s Bench Division: Master Trench struck out the statement of claim and dismissed the action.
• Queen’s Bench Division: Ebsworth J dismissed the claimant’s appeal on 10 June 1999 and refused leave to appeal.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The application for permission to appeal was dismissed under section 55(1) of the Administration of Justice Act 1999. A Grepe v Loam order was made.