Brighton & Hove City Council v Gill

A second-tier appeal requires permission only where it raises an important point of principle or practice, or there is another compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it. A renewed application concerning suspension of a possession warrant will not satisfy that threshold merely because the tenant disputes the consequences of housing-benefit arrangements. The court may consider updated evidence showing repeated failure to pay rent, failure to pursue benefit claims, and lack of any realistic repayment prospect. Where that evidence discloses no arguable point of principle and no compelling reason, permission should be refused.

Brighton & Hove City Council v Gill concerned an application for permission to bring a second-tier appeal. Brighton County Court Judge Kennedy QC had dismissed an appeal from District Judge Lay’s refusal to suspend a warrant for possession of council premises. The applicant was absent but had been notified of the hearing. The Court of Appeal considered updated evidence about the cessation of housing benefit, the rent arrears, and the applicant’s subsequent conduct. The central issue was whether the proposed appeal met the permission threshold for a second-tier appeal.

Lord Justice Jonathan Parker gave the first judgment, with which Lord Justice Mummery agreed.

1. Applicable threshold. The proposed appeal was a second-tier appeal. Under rule 52.13 of the Civil Procedure Rules, permission could be granted only if the appeal raised an important point of principle or practice, or if there was some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it.
2. Jurisdiction. Judge Hayward, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for permission. The Court of Appeal therefore treated the matter as an application for permission to appeal against Judge Kennedy QC’s dismissal of the appeal from District Judge Lay’s order.
3. Application of the threshold. The further evidence showed that housing benefit had ceased after the applicant failed to return an annual review form. He had been informed of the cessation and had made no timely contact with the Council. His later benefit-related applications were incomplete and he failed to provide requested income evidence. Despite earlier opportunities and promises, he had made almost no payments towards the rent or arrears, which had risen to nearly £2,500.
4. Conclusion and order. Judge Kennedy QC had considered the housing-benefit position carefully and was entitled to conclude that the applicant had made no real effort to discharge the arrears. The proposed appeal raised no important point of principle or practice and there was no other compelling reason to hear it. Permission to appeal was refused. The appeal was dismissed with costs assessed at £2,690.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): refused permission for a second-tier appeal and dismissed the appeal with costs.
• Brighton County Court: Judge Kennedy QC dismissed the appeal from District Judge Lay’s refusal to suspend the warrant for possession.
• Brighton County Court: District Judge Lay dismissed the application to suspend the warrant for possession.