Crowther v C B Gallon Cuthbertson Solicitors

A successful litigant does not ordinarily have a reasonable prospect of obtaining a retrial merely because he considers the trial unfair or wishes to pursue wider allegations of professional misconduct. A late request for trial by jury may properly be refused where the case has been allocated for trial by judge alone and changing the mode of trial would cause delay and additional cost. A payment into court is an established part of the civil justice process. Where damages assessed by the court are less than the payment, the ordinary procedural consequences must be applied, even if the claimant rejects the payment on principle.

The claimant had successfully sued his former solicitors for admitted negligence and breach of contract. His damages were assessed at £9,884 by His Honour Judge Grenfell in the Queen’s Bench Division at Leeds on 1 November 2000. The claimant sought permission to appeal, an extension of time, and a retrial before a jury. He wished the retrial to investigate allegations that the solicitors had acted dishonestly and had engaged in criminal conduct. The issues before the Court of Appeal were whether there was a reasonable prospect of setting aside the favourable judgment and ordering a new jury trial, and whether the consequences of a payment into court should be disturbed.

1. Application refused. Permission to appeal and an extension of time were refused. The claimant had already obtained judgment for damages based on admitted breaches of professional duty. His dissatisfaction with the handling of allegations of dishonesty did not provide a reasonable prospect that the judgment would be set aside and a retrial ordered.
2. Members of the legal profession are subject to the law, but that general principle did not determine whether this civil judgment should be reopened. Allegations of improper conduct which were unsubstantiated by evidence and irrelevant to causation and recoverable loss were not matters requiring a new trial.
3. The application for trial by jury had been raised late. The case had been allocated to the multi-track and ordered to be tried by a judge alone. At the trial stage, granting a jury trial would have caused further delay and costs, and the judge was entitled to refuse the application.
4. The payment into court was part of the civil justice process and was not open to challenge merely because the claimant regarded acceptance as permitting the solicitors to avoid accountability. Since the damages assessed were less than the payment, the judge was required to apply the ordinary procedural consequences, including the relevant costs set-off.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal and an extension of time refused.
• Queen’s Bench Division, Leeds District Registry: His Honour Judge Grenfell entered judgment for the claimant for £9,884 on 1 November 2000, following admissions of negligence and breach of contract by the solicitors.