Parry v Edwards Geldard (A Firm)

Permission for a second appeal requires more than a realistic or non-hopeless prospect of success. Under section 55(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999, the applicant must show an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to intervene.

A plainly wrong decision may constitute a compelling reason, but the court must be satisfied that allowing the existing order to stand would effectively condone an injustice. Financial value and an arguable prospect of reversal are insufficient. The threshold is higher where the case has already been appealed from the County Court to the High Court.

Alan Parry brought negligence proceedings against his former solicitors after relying on advice about the time for exercising a contractual right of pre-emption. Liability had previously been determined in his favour, and the proceedings were remitted for assessment of damages.

The County Court rejected a claim for loss of milk quota. Jacob J upheld that decision on appeal, while allowing the solicitors’ cross-appeal concerning travelling costs. Mr Parry sought permission for a further appeal to the Court of Appeal on the milk quota issue and sought to amend his notice to challenge the travelling costs decision.

The central issue was whether either proposed appeal satisfied the statutory threshold governing second appeals.

1. The renewed application for permission to appeal was dismissed. The application to amend the notice of appeal to include the travelling costs claim was also refused.

2. Section 55(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 applied because the proposed appeal followed an appeal from the County Court to the High Court. The relevant threshold was therefore higher than the ordinary requirement that a first appeal have a real prospect of success.

3. A realistic, non-hopeless prospect of success is not, by itself, a compelling reason for a second appeal. If the Court of Appeal were satisfied that the order was plainly wrong, that could constitute a compelling reason, but the court must be persuaded that leaving the order in place would effectively condone an injustice.

4. There was no sufficient basis for concluding that the pre-emption agreement required the land to be valued without regard to attached milk quota. If quota was attached, the valuation had apparently proceeded on a false basis, and Jacob J was not plainly wrong to consider that the valuation might have been set aside.

5. The proposed loss measure was also uncertain. Mr Parry would effectively have been buying litigation involving his brother and the purchasers of the quota. It could not be said that the lower courts were plainly wrong to reject a claim calculated simply by reference to the value of the quota.

6. The travelling costs issue raised no important point of principle or practice and disclosed no compelling reason for a further appeal.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): An earlier appeal determined liability in favour of Mr Parry.
• Cardiff County Court: His Honour Judge Masterman assessed damages, allowing the travelling costs claim but rejecting the milk quota claim.
• High Court, Chancery Division: Jacob J upheld the rejection of the milk quota claim and allowed the solicitors’ cross-appeal concerning travelling costs.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Renewed permission to appeal was refused, and permission to amend the notice of appeal was refused.