Society Of Lloyd's v Jaffray & Ors

Permission to appeal may be granted where the proposed appeal has a real prospect of success or where there is another compelling reason for it to be heard. The court may rely on the latter ground where the trial, judgment and evidential record are exceptionally extensive, and a properly informed decision on permission would require examination approaching the hearing of the appeal. Granting permission on that basis does not indicate any view on the merits. Grounds concerning the conduct of the trial may be adjourned to the court hearing the substantive appeal, where their significance can be assessed in context.

The Names sought permission to appeal from the judgment of Cresswell J in group litigation concerning alleged fraudulent misrepresentations by Lloyd's. On 3 November 2000, the judge rejected the threshold fraud case, finding no actionable misrepresentations, no relevant knowledge by Lloyd's officers, and no inducement of the sample Names. He refused permission to appeal on 21 December 2000. Applications were then made on paper to Clarke LJ and directed for oral hearing before a court of three. The central issue was whether permission should be granted under the applicable appeal test, and how grounds concerning the conduct of the lengthy trial should be dealt with.

The Master of the Rolls delivered the judgment of the court. The court granted permission to appeal on grounds 1–11 and adjourned grounds 12–15, together with equivalent complaints concerning the conduct of the trial, to the court hearing the substantive appeal.

1. Applicable threshold. Under rule 52.3(6) of the Civil Procedure Rules, permission could be granted only if the proposed appeal appeared to have a real prospect of success or there was some other compelling reason for it to be heard.
2. Compelling reason. The court was not satisfied, at the permission stage, that the appeal had a real prospect of success. However, the litigation was of great importance, the trial had lasted more than 60 days, the judgment exceeded 600 pages, and the applicants relied on extensive evidence and submissions. Determining the application fairly would have required a substantial review of the evidence and would have come close to hearing the appeal itself. In those circumstances, justice required that the appeal be heard.
3. No merits indication. The grant of permission was based on the compelling-reason limb and was expressly not an indication that the court had formed any view on the merits.
4. Trial-conduct grounds. Complaints about how the trial had been conducted were adjourned because the court hearing the substantive appeal would be better placed to assess their merit in the full context of the appeal.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): By this decision, the court granted permission to appeal on grounds 1–11 because there was another compelling reason for the appeal to be heard, and adjourned the remaining trial-conduct grounds.
2. Queen's Bench Division: Cresswell J gave judgment against the Names on the threshold fraud point on 3 November 2000 and refused permission to appeal on 21 December 2000. No citation for that judgment is stated in the judgment.