Chitolie v National Westminster Bank Plc

An application or appeal seeking to reopen matters already adjudicated in earlier proceedings is an abuse of the court’s process and should be refused. The refusal is justified notwithstanding uncertainty about the procedural character of the application where every possible analysis leads to the same result. A second-tier appeal under the Access to Justice Act 1999 requires an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason. A restrictive order controlling applications may be extended to applications in the Court of Appeal.

The claimant sought permission to appeal against an order made by Jacob J on 12 March 2001 in proceedings against the respondent bank. The underlying claim concerned an alleged undervalue sale of mortgaged property in about 1990.

Master Moncaster had granted the bank summary judgment under CPR Part 24, holding that the claim was time-barred and sought to relitigate matters previously dismissed by the Chelmsford County Court. An application for leave to appeal from that earlier dismissal had also been refused by Taylor LJ in 1991. The procedural effect of Jacob J’s order was uncertain: it might have dismissed an application under a Grepe v Loam order, refused relisting, or dismissed an appeal. The central issue was whether any of those routes permitted a further appeal.

1. The application was dismissed. Lord Justice Chadwick held that, on any of the three possible analyses of Jacob J’s order, the present application could not succeed.
2. The proceedings were plainly an attempt to relitigate complaints already raised in the Chelmsford County Court proceedings and already considered on an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. Seeking to relitigate matters already dealt with was an abuse of the court’s process.
3. If Jacob J had dismissed an appeal from Master Moncaster, the application was a second-tier appeal. Under section 55(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999, permission required an important point of principle or practice, or some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard. The proposed appeal disclosed neither.
4. If Jacob J had merely refused to relist an earlier permission application, the more liberal question would have been whether the appeal had any real prospect of success. The application failed on that basis also.
5. If Jacob J had acted under the Grepe v Loam order, there would be no appeal from his decision. Lord Justice Chadwick further held that the order made by Butterfield J on 30 October 2000 did not itself extend to applications in the Court of Appeal, but should be extended. No further application in the relevant proceedings was to be listed in that court unless the required permission had first been obtained.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The application for permission to appeal was dismissed as an abuse of process. The court extended the existing restrictive order to applications in the Court of Appeal.
• High Court, Chancery Division: Jacob J dismissed the appeal or permission application on 12 March 2001. Earlier, Master Moncaster had granted summary judgment for the bank under CPR Part 24.
• Chelmsford County Court: His Honour Judge Brandt dismissed the earlier proceedings on 22 November 1990. An application for leave to appeal was refused by Taylor LJ on 6 December 1991.