Cordle v Cordle

A second appeal should not proceed unless the statutory threshold is met: the case must raise an important point of law or practice, or there must be another compelling reason. That restriction does not prevent the correction of objectively demonstrated injustice arising from material errors of fact. In ancillary-relief appeals, the court may also consider whether review of a district judge’s order by a circuit judge should be subject to ordinary appellate restraint, with intervention absent manifest error. Where those matters require proper investigation, permission may be directed to an oral hearing before a fuller constitution of the court.

The applicant sought permission to appeal from an order made by Her Honour Judge Davis in the Sheffield County Court on 3 May 2001 concerning ancillary relief. The county-court process began with an order by District Judge Kirkham on 5 March 2001. The wife appealed, and the husband’s response operated in substance as a cross-appeal. The applicant alleged material factual errors and inadequate explanation in the circuit judge’s decision, including errors concerning assets, insurance proceeds and income.

The application was made slightly out of time and was subject to the restriction on second appeals in section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999. The central issue was whether the applicant had shown an important point of law or practice, another compelling reason, or an objectively arguable injustice sufficient to justify further appellate consideration.

1. Application for permission. Lord Justice Thorpe was prepared to overlook the slight delay in making the application. The substantial question was whether the applicant could overcome the burden imposed by section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999.
2. Statutory threshold. On the current law and practice, a second appeal should not proceed unless it raises an important point of law or practice, or there is another compelling reason. The court was not yet satisfied that the threshold had plainly been crossed, but the allegations required fuller examination.
3. Possible factual injustice. The applicant identified apparent errors or irrelevancies in the treatment of the Standard Life account, an alleged further policy of £18,000 and his income. He also challenged the circuit judge’s unexplained conclusion that the district judge’s order failed adequately to meet the wife’s and children’s needs. If those factual criticisms were established and objectively shown to have produced injustice, correction would not be prevented by the statutory restriction.
4. Appellate standard. Lord Justice Thorpe indicated that it might be timely to consider whether, in this field, a circuit judge’s review of a district judge’s order should be brought within ordinary appellate parameters, so that intervention would ordinarily require manifest error. That was an issue for the further hearing rather than a concluded determination.
5. Order. The application was allowed. It was directed to be heard at an oral hearing on notice, with the appeal to follow if permission were granted. The hearing was to be listed before three judges if practicable, otherwise two.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The application for permission to appeal from the order of Her Honour Judge Davis was allowed. The matter was directed to an oral hearing on notice, with an appeal to follow if permission were granted.
• Sheffield County Court: District Judge Kirkham made an ancillary-relief order on 5 March 2001. The wife appealed, and the husband responded with what was treated in substance as a cross-appeal. Her Honour Judge Davis made the order challenged in the Court of Appeal on 3 May 2001.