Lloyd v John Lewis Partnership

On a submission of no case to answer, the court must address the claimant’s case at its highest and determine whether the evidence could establish causation. Where an accident involved an unknown mechanism, the claimant was not required to prove why the mechanism occurred if the alleged negligence concerned exposure to the resulting danger. The critical question was whether the precaution relied on would probably have prevented the claimant from entering the dangerous position. The judge erred by failing to determine that question. The material-contribution approach in McGhee v National Coal Board was not applicable to this accident case, which involved a single alleged causal mechanism rather than cumulative exposure or causes.

The claimant, an employee of the defendant, was injured while delivering a bed through an upstairs window. The bed snagged on a ladder, and the claimant climbed beneath it to free the obstruction. When the bed moved, it struck him.

At the Central London County Court, His Honour Judge Cooke dismissed the claim at the close of the claimant’s case, holding that the claimant had not shown that the absence of a fourth man or stabilising equipment caused the accident. The claimant appealed, challenging the causation ruling, the exclusion of expert evidence and the judge’s approach to a submission of no case to answer. The central issue was whether the evidence could establish that securing the ladder would probably have prevented the claimant from occupying the position in which he was injured.

1. Appeal allowed. The order dismissing the claim was set aside. The case was remitted for a new or further trial before His Honour Judge Cooke.
2. Under the general rule stated in Alexander v Rayson and reaffirmed in Boyce v Wyatt Engineering and others, a judge should ordinarily require the defendant to elect whether to call evidence before entertaining a submission of no case to answer. That procedural error did not itself determine the appeal, because the result depended on the causation issue.
3. The claimant’s expert evidence was properly excluded under Part 35 of the Civil Procedure Rules. It did not assist in resolving how the accident occurred, why the bed snagged, or whether a fourth man would have prevented the claimant from entering the dangerous position.
4. The judge identified several possible causes of the snag, but failed to decide the critical question: whether the claimant would have been in the position of danger if the ladder had been secured by a fourth man or stabilising equipment. The claimant’s evidence raised a real possibility that he would have acted differently and freed the snag without placing himself beneath the bed. The evidence did not make failure inevitable.
5. The court rejected reliance on the material-contribution reasoning in McGhee v National Coal Board. That approach concerned cumulative exposure or multiple causal contributions. The issue here was ordinary factual causation: whether the absence of the precaution caused the claimant to be in the dangerous position. Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw was explained as an example of material contribution arising from dust from two sources.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the appeal, set aside the order made on 11 October 2000 and remitted the case for a new or further trial before His Honour Judge Cooke.
• Central London County Court: His Honour Judge Cooke dismissed the personal-injury claim at the close of the claimant’s case.