Matin v Commissioner Of Police For The Metropolis

On a second appeal, permission should be granted only where the proposed appeal raises an important point of principle or practice, or there is another compelling reason to hear it. Public interest arising solely from the identity of a public defendant is not, without more, compelling. A compelling reason may exist where a pure point of law is closely intertwined with issues that will in any event be tried by a jury, so that deciding it on appeal will add little cost and may affect the trial or damages. Permission may then be granted on a strictly limited basis.

The applicant sought permission for a second appeal from Garland J’s decision refusing to restore his claim for malicious prosecution. The claim arose from his arrest and prosecution after he presented a cheque drawn on an association’s account. The Crown Prosecution Service later decided not to proceed.

Other claims, including false arrest, conspiracy and trespass arising from a search, remained capable of proceeding, and the surviving issues were expected to be tried by a jury. The central question was whether there was an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason, to hear the proposed appeal concerning reasonable and probable cause.

1. Permission threshold. The court treated this as a second appeal. Under Civil Procedure Rules, Order 52.13(2), permission required an important point of principle or practice or another compelling reason. The applicant identified no sufficient point under the first limb.
2. Compelling reason. The Commissioner’s status as a public defendant did not itself provide a compelling reason. There was, however, a compelling reason in the close relationship between the proposed legal issue and the surviving claims. Those claims were expected to be tried by a jury, and malice or absence of malice by the arresting or investigating officers might be material to the jury’s findings.
3. Proposed point of law. It was arguable that evidence of malice could bear on whether the prosecutor had an honest belief in the accused’s guilt and therefore on the reasonableness of belief in the probable outcome of the prosecution. The court considered it arguable that evidence of malice might require the judge to leave reasonable and probable cause to the jury. It expressed no concluded view on the effect of the point on the eventual outcome or damages.
4. Disposition. Leave to appeal was granted on that very limited basis and on one point of law only. The order recorded that the appeal was allowed on the limited basis noted, with judgment for the applicant at public expense and costs in the appeal. The court also recommended that the parties explore an early settlement.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 11 October 2001, Ward LJ granted permission for the limited second appeal from Garland J’s decision, which had refused to restore the malicious prosecution claim after Master Trench’s earlier order. Permission was confined to one point of law concerning the relationship between malice and reasonable and probable cause.
• High Court: Garland J had restored claims for false arrest and conspiracy but upheld the striking out of the malicious prosecution claim. The judgment states that Master Trench had earlier struck out substantially all claims except the trespass claim arising from the search.