Moore, R (on the application of) v London Rent Assessment Committee

A rent assessment committee remains seised of a reference after its decision is quashed; quashing the decision does not quash the reference or require a fresh referral. Decisions whether to adjourn are matters for the committee’s discretion and are not ordinarily reviewable absent legal error. Judicial review cannot be used to challenge the committee’s assessment of comparable rents where the legislation provides an appeal on a point of law. Delay caused by proceedings that quashed the original decision does not make the reference statute-barred. Permission may also be refused where the dispute has become academic.

Mr Moore challenged a decision of the London Rent Assessment Committee increasing the registered rent of his former flat to £50 a week. An earlier committee decision had been quashed by Latham J because Mr Moore was absent. The committee later refused to allow withdrawal of the reference and refused a further adjournment before making the new assessment.

Jackson J refused permission to apply for judicial review. In the Court of Appeal, Mr Moore argued that the committee lacked jurisdiction, that the reference was statute-barred, that the hearing should have been adjourned, and that the committee had failed to consider comparable assessments. The central issue was whether any of those matters disclosed a reviewable error.

1. Application refused. The Court of Appeal agreed with Jackson J’s reasons for refusing permission to apply for judicial review and refused the application for permission to appeal.
2. The quashing of the earlier committee decision did not quash the underlying reference. The reference remained before the committee, which was therefore entitled and obliged to proceed with it. No fresh referral by the High Court was required.
3. The decision whether to adjourn was within the committee’s discretion. The history of non-attendance and late adjournment applications, together with the absence of medical evidence, provided a sufficient basis for refusing the application. The matter disclosed no realistic ground for judicial review.
4. The reference was not statute-barred merely because more than two years had elapsed. The delay resulted from the earlier proceedings and the quashing of the original decision.
5. Complaint about the weight given to comparable rent assessments concerned the merits of the committee’s decision, not a matter for judicial review. Any legal question was subject to the statutory appeal route to the Court of Appeal on a point of law.
6. The proceedings were in any event probably academic. Mr Moore had left the premises, the possession judgment pre-dated the £50 assessment, and the registered rent was unlikely to have practical significance for the landlord after possession had been obtained.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): refused permission to appeal and dismissed Mr Moore’s application, agreeing with the reasons given below.
• High Court, Administrative Court: Jackson J refused permission to apply for judicial review. An earlier committee decision had been quashed by Latham J because Mr Moore had not been present.