Collins v CPS Fuels Ltd

When an action has been struck out because of inexcusable procedural failures amounting to an abuse of process, a fresh action raising the same issues will ordinarily also be an abuse. The court may nevertheless permit it to continue if a sufficient or powerful reason, assessed under the overriding objective, makes that course just.

The inquiry is fact-specific and requires a broad evaluation of all relevant circumstances. “Special reason” is useful shorthand, not a statutory formula or a distinct legal threshold. An appellate court should interfere with a carefully reasoned case-management discretion only where the decision is wrong, procedurally unjust, plainly unsustainable or outside the permissible range of reasonable decisions.

An infant claimant obtained judgment on liability for injuries sustained in a road traffic accident. Her damages claim was later struck out after her solicitors repeatedly failed to comply with court orders and twice failed to attend case-management conferences. The county court subsequently refused to set aside that order, and no application for permission to appeal was made to the Court of Appeal.

The claimant instead commenced a second action against the same defendant upon the same cause of action. His Honour Judge Kevin Barnett struck it out under rule 3.4(2)(b) of the Civil Procedure Rules as an abuse of process. The claimant appealed with the judge's permission.

The central issues were whether the second action was an abuse, whether sufficient reason existed to allow it to continue under the overriding objective, and whether the first-instance exercise of discretion could properly be disturbed.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Bodey J, giving the first judgment, held that the county court had adopted the correct approach. Jonathan Parker LJ and Judge LJ agreed. A claimant whose first action was struck out following inexcusable failures to comply with rules and orders could not simply relitigate the same issues. The second action was an abuse unless a sufficient reason, considered under the overriding objective, justified allowing it to proceed.

2. The assessment was a broad and fact-specific exercise. The judge had properly considered the claimant's childhood and innocence, the availability of a strong claim against her solicitors, the continuing possibility of a fair trial, the defendant's resulting windfall, the prospect of satellite litigation, and the use of past and future court resources. None, individually or collectively, supplied a sufficient reason to permit the second action.

3. Judge LJ explained that “some special reason”, derived from Arbuthnot Latham Bank Ltd v Trafalgar Holdings Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 1426, was forensic shorthand. It did not derive from statute or the Civil Procedure Rules, was not a ritual formula, and could equally be expressed as a very good, powerful or sufficient reason. Semantic comparisons with fact-specific decisions were unhelpful.

4. The restriction on access to a court was compatible with article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Striking out an abusive second action pursued legitimate aims, including protecting defendants, allocating limited resources fairly, and promoting the effective administration of justice. Where no sufficient reason justified continuation, the sanction was proportionate rather than arbitrary or absolute.

5. The discretion belonged to the first-instance judge. Under rule 52.11(3) of the Civil Procedure Rules and the principles in Hadmor Productions Ltd v Hamilton [1983] AC 191 and Biguzzi v Rank Leisure PLC [1999] 1 WLR 1926, appellate intervention required error, serious procedural injustice or a decision outside the permissible range of reasonable disagreement. The carefully reasoned decision was plainly right and could not be faulted.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The claimant's appeal was dismissed unanimously. The order striking out the second action as an abuse of process was upheld.

2. Chester County Court, 7 August 2000: His Honour Judge Kevin Barnett struck out the second action under rule 3.4(2)(b) of the Civil Procedure Rules, but granted permission to appeal.

3. Chester County Court, 10 January 2000: The judge refused to set aside the earlier strike-out and refused permission to appeal. No application for permission was made to the Court of Appeal.

4. Chester County Court, 22 September 1999: The original action was struck out following non-compliance with a peremptory order and failure to attend the adjourned case-management conference.