A (A Child), Re

When deciding whether a child should remain subject to interim care arrangements, the court must consider whether a residential assessment under section 38(6) is necessary to obtain information needed for the ultimate care decision. The court must not pre-empt the assessment merely because the parent currently lacks insight into a mental illness or has refused earlier treatment. It must evaluate whether assessment could produce a different result, including whether insight may develop with support. Findings that assessment is pointless require clear reasons and must be grounded in the evidence, particularly where expert opinion is relied upon. The court must balance the harm and delay involved in assessment against the prospect of obtaining reliable information and preserving the possibility of reunification.

The local authority obtained care proceedings after the mother, who had psychiatric and parenting difficulties, left a mother-and-baby assessment placement and later refused proposed psychiatric assessment. The child was placed in foster care. The judge found that the statutory threshold was met and concluded that there was no prospect of safe return to the mother, whether or not further assessment took place. He made a residence order in favour of the maternal grandmother, whose placement carried recognised risks but was preferred to care leading to adoption.

The mother appealed, arguing that the judge had misunderstood the role of section 38(6) of the Children Act 1989, failed properly to assess the psychiatric evidence, and was wrong to reject further assessment.

Appeal allowed. The residence order was set aside and an assessment of mother and child under section 38(6) of the Children Act 1989 was ordered, together with an interim care order for 28 days and detailed directions for the assessment.

1. Section 38(6) concerns interim orders. Its purpose is to enable the court to obtain information necessary for deciding whether to make a final care order, notwithstanding that day-to-day decision-making otherwise rests with the local authority. The court may override the local authority’s view where necessary to perform that function, following In re C (A Minor) (Interim Care Order: Residential Assessment) [1997] AC 489.
2. The proper question was whether further psychiatric and parenting assessment might assist the court in deciding the section 31 threshold and whether a final care order should be made, or whether a further interim order was required. The judge instead treated the issue as whether the child could safely be returned to the mother through assessment and concluded, in effect, that assessment was pointless.
3. That conclusion was unsupported. The evidence showed that the mother had at times provided good care, that bipolar illness did not necessarily prevent effective parenting with treatment and support, and that insight could develop. The judge failed to explain why he rejected or preferred the relevant expert evidence and failed to address the mother’s later willingness to undertake assessment. The requirement for transparent reasons stated in Flannery v Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 377 was engaged.
4. The appellate court was entitled to interfere because the essential finding that the mother would inevitably remain without insight was against the weight of the evidence. Time remained available for assessment. The potential benefit of reliable information and possible reunification outweighed the anticipated disruption and delay.

Lord Justice Waller agreed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): appeal allowed; assessment of mother and child ordered under section 38(6) of the Children Act 1989; interim care order made for 28 days.
• High Court: His Honour Judge Hedley made a residence order in favour of the maternal grandmother on 24 November 2000.