Choudry v Law Society Of England & Wales

Rule 30 of the Solicitors (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules 1994 is not confined to decisions made in proceedings in which the solicitor was formally a party. A decision may relate to the solicitor where it contains findings about the solicitor’s conduct in proceedings in which the solicitor participated in a full and effective manner. Such findings may be admitted as prima facie proof in disciplinary proceedings, subject to compliance with article 6. Article 6 is not infringed where the solicitor had a proper opportunity to contest the allegations in the original proceedings and could rebut or challenge the judgment before the disciplinary tribunal.

An application was made for permission to appeal against the Administrative Court’s dismissal of an appeal from the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. The Tribunal had admitted a judgment of the Court of Appeal in earlier costs proceedings as prima facie proof of misconduct under rule 30 of the Solicitors (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules 1994, and had ordered that the applicant be struck off.

The applicant argued that the earlier judgment did not relate to him because he had not initially been a formal party, and that reliance on it infringed article 6. The central issues were the proper construction of rule 30 and whether its application was procedurally fair.

1. Application refused. There was no reasonable prospect of successfully appealing the Administrative Court’s decision.
2. Rule 30 applies where proceedings involve the decision of another court or tribunal and the decision relates to the relevant solicitor. The words “relating to” should not be restricted to a judgment given in proceedings in which the solicitor was formally a party. Rule 30(2), referring to a conviction, finding, sentence or judgment, naturally includes findings made against a solicitor who participated in proceedings in another capacity.
3. The rule sensibly permits findings about the manner in which proceedings were conducted by a solicitor to be admitted as prima facie proof in disciplinary proceedings. The admission remains subject to the requirements of article 6.
4. On the facts, the applicant had played a full part in the proceedings before Nelson J. He was represented by leading counsel, was a central figure in the investigation, gave evidence and was cross-examined. By the time of the appeal from Nelson J’s judgment, he had also been made a formal party.
5. There was therefore no arguable breach of article 6. Before the Tribunal, the applicant could have adduced evidence to rebut the earlier judgment and could have sought leave to cross-examine witnesses, but did not do so.
6. The application for permission to appeal was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal against the Administrative Court’s judgment was refused.
• Administrative Court: On 30 July 2001, dismissed the applicant’s appeal from the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal.
• Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal: On 31 October 2000, admitted the earlier Court of Appeal judgment as prima facie proof of misconduct and ordered that the applicant be struck off.