McManus v Mannings Marine Ltd

For limitation purposes, the relevant injury under the Limitation Act 1980 is the injury for which the action is brought. Where a claimant’s condition is later exacerbated by a separate period of employment, the date of knowledge must be assessed by reference to that exacerbation and the particular defendant. Different employers may therefore have different dates of knowledge. The discretion under section 33 must be exercised on that correct basis, taking account of any claim that remains within the primary limitation period.

The claimant brought proceedings against former employers for vibration white finger. The claim against Mannings Marine Ltd was dismissed by the Oldham County Court after a preliminary trial on limitation. The recorder held that the claimant had knowledge of a significant injury by September 1992 and declined to disapply limitation under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980.

On appeal, the claimant argued that his claim against Mannings concerned a later exacerbation caused by employment beginning in August 1993. The central issue was whether the September 1992 date of knowledge applied against that employer and that later injury.

1. Appeal allowed. The order dismissing the claim was set aside. It was common ground that the claim could not properly be dismissed insofar as it concerned exacerbation occurring within the primary limitation period.
2. Meaning of the relevant injury. Lady Justice Hale held that section 14(1) of the Limitation Act 1980 had to be read with section 11, which concerns damages in respect of personal injuries. The phrase “the injury in question” referred to the injury in respect of which the action was brought. This claim concerned exacerbation during the claimant’s later employment, rather than the earlier injury sustained during two short periods of employment.
3. Defendant-specific knowledge. The statutory elements of knowledge had to be considered in relation to the particular defendant and the alleged act or omission. Knowledge that the claimant had a significant condition caused by work did not necessarily establish knowledge that a significant injury was attributable to this employer. A fresh period of exposure causing further injury gave rise to a new cause of action and could result in a later date of knowledge. Lord Justice Keene agreed, observing that the claimant had not suffered vibration white finger in the right hand by September 1992.
4. Section 33 discretion and remittal. The recorder had exercised his discretion on an incorrect basis, had made no findings about when the later exacerbation became significant, and had not properly considered the continuing employment or the claim within time. The Court of Appeal would not substitute its own discretion. The limitation issue was remitted to the trial judge to be dealt with at trial, where it was closely connected with the merits. The trial judge was directed to deal with the costs below, and the respondent was ordered to pay £7,700 costs of the appeal.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) allowed the appeal, set aside the county court order, and remitted the limitation issue to the trial judge for determination at trial.
• Oldham County Court, on 30 April 2001, dismissed the claim after a preliminary limitation issue, held that the claimant’s date of knowledge was no later than September 1992, and declined to exercise the section 33 discretion.