HM Attorney General v Arora

On an application under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, the court determines whether the applicant’s past conduct satisfies the statutory description of vexatious litigation. It does not investigate the merits of the individual proceedings relied upon, unless a separate legal issue requires consideration. A civil proceedings order is discretionary. An appellate court will intervene only where the lower court’s decision is manifestly wrong. The Human Rights Act does not, without more, alter the established approach that the merits of the underlying proceedings are generally irrelevant to the section 42 inquiry.

The Divisional Court, comprising Brooke LJ and Silber J, made a civil proceedings order against Mr Arora on 23 July 2001 under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. The order was limited to 12 years. The court was satisfied that he had habitually and persistently, and without reasonable grounds, instituted vexatious civil proceedings and made vexatious applications.

Mr Arora sought permission to appeal. He argued that the underlying cases involved cumulative injustices and racial prejudice, that the Human Rights Act had altered the governing law, and that an arbitration clause in his business terms made a civil proceedings order unnecessary. The central issues were whether the Divisional Court had properly assessed his past conduct and whether its discretionary order should be disturbed.

1. Application refused. There was no reasonable prospect of upsetting the Divisional Court’s finding that Mr Arora’s conduct could properly be characterised within section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. The lower court had directed itself to the high standard of proof applicable to the Attorney-General’s complaint about past conduct.
2. On an application under section 42, the court is not concerned with the merits or otherwise of the points taken in the proceedings on which the Attorney-General relies. That principle, stated in Attorney-General v Jones [1990] 1 WLR 859, was not displaced by the Human Rights Act. The Act contained nothing incompatible with it. Any possible application of particular Human Rights Act provisions to individual underlying cases had not been investigated and did not affect this application.
3. The making of a civil proceedings order is not punishment. It requires the litigant to obtain permission from a High Court judge before commencing proceedings, while preserving the right to apply for that permission. The existence of a possible arbitration clause did not make the order inappropriate.
4. The decision whether to make such an order, including its duration, is primarily discretionary. The Court of Appeal would interfere only if the Divisional Court’s decision were manifestly wrong. It was not manifestly wrong, and there was no reason to suppose that it was wrong at all.

No order for costs.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal from the Divisional Court was refused; no order for costs.
• Divisional Court: On 23 July 2001, Brooke LJ and Silber J made a civil proceedings order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, limited to 12 years.