Moro v Secretary Of State For Home Department

In determining whether an asylum claimant has a well-founded fear of persecution, the appellate authorities must assess whether the fear is objectively well founded and arises for a Convention reason. Relevant past events may be considered cumulatively, but a plausible alternative inference on the evidence does not establish an error of law. The removal or loss of government employment will not ordinarily constitute persecution where other employment is available, even if employment is made conditional upon attending a course promoting the government’s political philosophy. The position might differ in an extreme case, such as a course advocating genocide. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal because neither the Tribunal’s treatment of the claimant’s detention nor its approach to compulsory retirement disclosed an error of law.

The appellant, a Ugandan national and member of the Acholi tribe, claimed asylum after leaving Uganda. He relied on earlier detention and maltreatment following criticism of the government, reporting conditions, suspension and compulsory retirement from his Post Office employment, and a later detention and alleged ill-treatment at a roadblock.

A Special Adjudicator accepted that the 1993 detention was persecutory but treated the 1995 detention as random and unrelated to the appellant’s political history. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal dismissed the appeal, finding no well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. The central issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the Tribunal had failed to assess the events cumulatively and whether compulsory retirement from government employment constituted persecution.

The court, in a judgment delivered by Lord Justice Schiemann on behalf of the court, dismissed the appeal.

1. Appellate review. The appellate authorities had to decide whether the appellant established a reasonable degree of likelihood that he subjectively feared persecution and that the fear was objectively well founded for a Convention reason. The Court of Appeal’s task was limited to deciding whether the Tribunal had committed an error of law in concluding that the fear was not objectively well founded.
2. Cumulative assessment. The appellant’s detention, maltreatment, reporting conditions, loss of employment and later detention could properly be considered together. The Tribunal had been entitled, however, to evaluate the competing explanations for the 1995 detention. The evidence did not establish that the Tribunal had misunderstood the appellant’s case or failed to address the cumulative argument. Its conclusions were therefore not legally erroneous.
3. Compulsory retirement. The effective loss of government employment for refusing to attend a political re-education course did not, on the evidence, amount to persecution where other employment was available. The court declined to consider the broader theoretical debate at length. It was not arguable that requiring attendance at a course explaining the government’s philosophy, in circumstances not involving an extreme ideology such as genocide, constituted persecution in itself.
4. Neither ground, whether considered separately or cumulatively, justified interference with the Tribunal’s decision. The appeal was dismissed, with the appellant’s costs to be assessed under the Community Legal Services (Costs) Regulations.

• Immigration Appeal Tribunal: dismissed the appellant’s appeal and refused permission to appeal.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): permission to appeal was granted by a single Lord Justice. The appeal was heard and dismissed.