Mehta v Evans Dodd (A Firm of Solicitors) & Ors

Permission to appeal is refused where the proposed appeal has no realistic prospect of success and no other compelling reason for a hearing. A litigant’s entitlement to a fair hearing does not require defendants to bear the stress and expense of proceedings which have no arguable merit.

A Grepe v Loam-type order is a procedural filter, rather than a denial of access to the court, where the litigant remains able to issue proceedings by showing proper justification. Damages for the same wrong are not cumulative: acceptance of full satisfaction from one concurrent tortfeasor prevents further recovery against others for the same loss.

The claimant, acting in person, sought permission to appeal orders of Jack J and Hallett J in the Queen’s Bench Division. The orders dismissed interlocutory applications, struck out fresh proceedings against four solicitor firms as an abuse of process, and required the claimant to obtain permission before bringing further proceedings arising from his earlier eviction.

He also sought release from an undertaking given to the Court of Appeal in a compromise with the Royal Bank of Scotland, under which he agreed not to issue further proceedings concerning the eviction. The central questions were whether the proposed appeals had a real prospect of success or another compelling justification, whether the restriction on further proceedings was permissible, and whether the undertaking should be reopened.

1. Permission to appeal. The applications were dismissed. Under Order 52 rule 3.6, permission requires either a real prospect of success or some other compelling reason. Neither condition was satisfied. The orders below were exercises of judicial discretion reached after careful consideration of the claimant’s extensive litigation history and allegations.
2. Abuse of process and finality. Hallett J was entitled to conclude that the new proceedings attempted to relitigate causes of action and issues already determined, without new evidence or a new arguable cause of action. The addition of further solicitor firms did not alter the essential nature of the dispute. The claimant’s continuing sense of grievance could not provide a legal basis for further claims after he had been compensated for the eviction.
3. Restriction on further proceedings. The Grepe v Loam-type order did not deny access to the court. It imposed a permission filter, justified by the litigation history, the burden imposed on other parties and the need to protect other litigants’ access to judicial resources. Hallett J was best placed to assess the necessity of the order after hearing the claimant over two days. In an appropriate case, such an order is compatible with Article 6 of the Convention.
4. Concurrent tortfeasors and undertaking. The claimant could not recover cumulative damages for the same eviction from successive concurrent tortfeasors. The compromise with the Royal Bank of Scotland achieved finality, and no sufficient basis was shown for releasing the claimant from his undertaking. That application was therefore also dismissed.
5. Lord Justice Parker agreed with Mr Justice Bodey’s reasons. All applications were dismissed, with no order for costs.

• Queen’s Bench Division: Jack J dismissed the claimant’s interlocutory applications on 23 May 2001. Hallett J struck out the proceedings and made a Grepe v Loam-type order on 27 June 2001.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal both orders was refused. The application to be released from the undertaking given in the earlier Court of Appeal proceedings was also dismissed.