Barnes v Uttlesford District Council

A decision of the High Court on a case stated is final where the governing statute so provides. Under section 28A(4) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, the stated exception is the right of appeal to the House of Lords in criminal cases under the Administration of Justice Act 1960. The Court of Appeal must first ask whether it would have jurisdiction to hear the proposed appeal; if not, it cannot grant permission. The Civil Division has no jurisdiction over a criminal cause or matter. The approach in Re A Company [1980] Ch 138 had been reversed by the House of Lords in [1981] AC 374. Maile v Manchester City Council confirmed the finality provision’s effect.

Mr Peter Barnes challenged a judgment of Laws J, given on 4 July 1997 on a case stated from the Magistrates’ Court. The case concerned the distraint of his BMW for unpaid council tax and his contention that he needed the vehicle for his trade.

Two applications came before the Court of Appeal. One treated the matter as a criminal cause or matter and sought certification of a point of law for a possible appeal to the House of Lords. The other treated it as civil and sought permission to appeal from the High Court’s decision. Mr Barnes also sought an adjournment of the civil application for lack of notice. The central questions were whether this court had jurisdiction on either basis and, if the matter was civil, whether permission could be granted.

Lord Justice Longmore gave the first judgment. Lord Justice Simon Brown agreed. The applications were dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

1. On the criminal application, the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) had no jurisdiction to entertain a criminal cause or matter. That included the proposed challenge to Laws J’s refusal to certify a point of law for a possible appeal under the Administration of Justice Act 1960. The court therefore dismissed that application and expressed no view on whether certification should be undertaken by a judge other than the judge who decided the case.
2. The court treated the underlying case as civil because it concerned restraint for recovery of council tax. On an application for permission to appeal, the preliminary question was whether the Court of Appeal would have jurisdiction to hear the appeal if permission were granted. Since the proposed appeal arose from a case stated for the High Court under section 111 of the Magistrates’ Court 1980, section 28A(4) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 made the High Court’s decision final, subject to the criminal appeal exception. The Court of Appeal consequently had no jurisdiction and could not grant permission.
3. Maile v Manchester City Council was treated as confirming that the statutory finality provision had to be given its stated effect. The applicant’s reliance on Re A Company [1980] Ch 138, where an appeal had been allowed despite statutory finality because the judge allegedly lacked jurisdiction, could not assist him. That decision had been reversed by the House of Lords in [1981] AC 374, which held that the statute permitted no separate exception for jurisdictional questions.
4. The applicant’s wider complaints about the council and the earlier judgment did not address the jurisdictional questions before the court. The request for an adjournment was refused because both applications arose from the same judgment and the applicant knew the issues involved.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 8 February 2001, dismissed both applications and refused leave to appeal.
2. Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative Court): Laws J gave judgment on 4 July 1997 on a case stated from the Magistrates’ Court. He held that Mr Barnes was not entitled to use his BMW in his trade for the relevant purpose and gave judgment in favour of the council.
3. Magistrates’ Court: The proceedings arose from the distraint of Mr Barnes’s BMW for unpaid council tax, following which a question of law was stated for the High Court.