Reynard v Secretary of State for Trade & Industry

On a second appeal, disagreement with the lower court’s factual findings does not itself raise a question of law or an important point of principle. Permission requires an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason. An abstract legal issue may be insufficient where it has no necessary practical consequence for the appeal. A respondent to another party’s permitted appeal may nevertheless advance arguments opposing the proposed result without obtaining separate permission.

The appellant had been disqualified from acting as a director for ten years by the registrar on grounds of misconduct demonstrating unfitness. Blackburne J upheld the disqualification but reduced the period to five and a half years and varied the costs order. Both parties sought permission to appeal.

Aldous LJ refused the appellant’s application for a second appeal but granted the Secretary of State permission on grounds concerning the relevance of dishonest oral evidence to the assessment of fitness and the period of disqualification, and the period fixed by Blackburne J. The central issue was whether the appellant had an independent basis for a further appeal.

1. Permission refused. Sedley LJ held that the appellant’s written and oral submissions principally reargued the facts. His contention that Blackburne J had reached factual conclusions which were wrong did not, without more, raise a question of law or a ground capable of founding a second appeal.
2. The applicable second-appeal threshold under Part 52.13 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 was not met. Although the Secretary of State’s first ground raised a genuine legal question concerning whether conduct in court could aggravate or mitigate a director’s unfitness or the period of disqualification, that question was stated in the abstract. It had no necessary consequence unless it could justify altering the period of disqualification on the Secretary of State’s permitted appeal.
3. The alleged evasive or mendacious appearance arose from counsel’s unsuccessful attempt in re-examination to attribute the misconduct to a wholly owned subsidiary which had never traded. Blackburne J had recognised the potential injustice of attributing counsel’s error of judgment to the appellant. In reducing the disqualification from ten years to five and a half years, the judge had fully removed the adverse consequences of that episode from the decision.
4. The appellant therefore had no independent ground of appeal. He could nevertheless oppose the Secretary of State’s permitted appeal as a respondent and argue that the facts did not justify increasing the period, without obtaining permission for a separate appeal.
5. The application for permission to appeal was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Sedley LJ refused the appellant’s application for permission to bring a second appeal.
• Chancery Division, Companies Court: Blackburne J upheld the registrar’s disqualification order, reduced its duration from ten years to five and a half years, and varied the costs order.
• Registrar: Mr Registrar Simmonds originally disqualified the appellant for ten years on grounds of misconduct demonstrating unfitness.
• Aldous LJ had previously refused the appellant’s permission application while granting the Secretary of State permission on two grounds.