Tilly v London Borough Of Tower Hamlets

A High Court judge cannot reopen or reverse another High Court judge’s refusal of permission to appeal. A proposed second appeal requires an important point of principle or practice. Where no such point arises, permission should be refused. An appeal may be dismissed as superfluous where the substantive issue remains before another court, without affecting that surviving claim. Costs are matters of judicial discretion, and an appellate court will interfere only where material error is shown. An order for costs against an unsuccessful litigant is not prohibited by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Mrs Gwendolen Rose Tilly, a tenant of the Council, brought proceedings concerning alleged overpayments of rent and rates and claimed damages for harassment and related matters. An earlier Queen’s Bench Division action had been restricted to repayment of an alleged overpayment. A second action in the Mayor’s and City of London Court was struck out by Judge Simpson as an abuse of process.

Lightman J granted permission to appeal only in relation to repayment of overpayments. Park J dismissed that appeal as superfluous, while preserving Mrs Tilly’s right to continue the repayment claim in the transferred Queen’s Bench Division proceedings, and ordered costs. Mrs Tilly sought permission to appeal Park J’s order, including a challenge to the limited permission and the costs order. The central issues were jurisdiction to revisit Lightman J’s order, the requirements for a second appeal, and the compatibility of costs with human rights protections.

Application dismissed. There was no jurisdiction to grant permission to appeal.

1. Park J had correctly treated the matter before him as an appeal from Judge Simpson’s order. The appeal concerning the second action was superfluous because the repayment issue was already being pursued in the Queen’s Bench Division proceedings. His order did not prevent Mrs Tilly from continuing that claim.
2. To the extent that Mrs Tilly sought to challenge Lightman J’s order, Park J could not entertain that challenge. One High Court judge has no power to allow an appeal from another High Court judge. Further, where the earlier refusal of permission to appeal was made in open court, the matter could not be taken further under section 54(4) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 and Part 52 Practice Direction, paragraph 4.8 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
3. The proposed appeal would also have been a second appeal. Permission for such an appeal required an important point of principle or practice. No such point was raised.
4. The costs order disclosed no basis for appellate intervention. Costs are awarded in the exercise of judicial discretion, and no material error in that exercise had been shown.
5. The order for costs was not contrary to Article 6 or any other Article of the European Convention on Human Rights. The application was therefore dismissed, with the operative order recorded as: “Application dismissed. No jurisdiction for permission to appeal.”

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 8 November 2001, dismissed Mrs Tilly’s application for permission to appeal and held that there was no jurisdiction to grant permission.
2. Queen’s Bench Division, Park J: On 25 July 2001, dismissed the appeal from Judge Simpson’s strike-out order as superfluous, without affecting the continuing repayment claim, and ordered costs.
3. Lightman J: Granted permission to appeal from Judge Simpson’s order, limited to the claim for repayment of overpayments.
4. Mayor’s and City of London Court: Judge Simpson struck out the second action as an abuse of process.