Anfield v Anfield

Permission for a second-tier appeal must be refused unless the proposed appeal raises an important point of principle or practice, or there is another compelling reason. The Court of Appeal will not grant permission merely because an applicant remains distressed by an adverse ancillary-relief outcome or disputes the conduct of the earlier hearing. Where the proposed appeal is plainly doomed to fail, permission should be refused, particularly where pursuing it would increase the applicant’s costs without practical benefit.

The proceedings concerned ancillary relief following the breakdown of a long marriage. District Judge Hayes ordered that the matrimonial home, when sold, should be divided three-quarters to the wife and one-quarter to the husband. On the wife’s appeal, Her Honour Judge Plumstead concluded that the district judge had reached the correct result and dismissed the appeal, making only technical refinements to the order and ordering the wife to pay the appeal costs.

The wife, acting in person, applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to bring a second-tier appeal. The central issue was whether the statutory threshold for such permission was met.

1. Application refused. Lord Justice Thorpe held that the application fell within section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999, which required refusal of permission for a second-tier appeal unless there was an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason.
2. The wife’s distress, her anxieties about the conduct of the circuit-court hearing, and her belief that the transcript did not record everything said below did not establish that statutory threshold. The court could not grant permission merely to provide temporary relief from that distress.
3. Even if permission were granted, the proposed appeal was doomed to fail. Granting permission would therefore expose the wife to increased costs without providing any benefit. The hardship affecting both parties resulted from the limited value of the matrimonial assets after the breakdown of the marriage, rather than from an arguable error identified in the decisions below.
4. The order was: Application refused.

1. Norwich County Court: District Judge Hayes ordered division of the matrimonial home proceeds in the proportions of three-quarters to the wife and one-quarter to the husband.
2. Appeal before the circuit judge: Her Honour Judge Plumstead dismissed the wife’s appeal, making only technical refinements to the order and ordering her to bear the appeal costs.
3. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Lord Justice Thorpe refused permission for a second-tier appeal.