Dhadly, R (on the application of) v London Borough Of Greenwich

Judicial review is concerned principally with the legality of the decision-making process and reasoning, rather than with substituting the court’s decision for that of the designated decision-maker. A court may stay proceedings where the claimant has already obtained all that the proceedings can properly provide, even without the parties’ consent. Where the substantive issue remains open and more than one lawful decision is possible, the court should ordinarily remit the matter to the decision-making body. The power to determine the substance itself is reserved for cases where only one substantive decision is available and remittal would serve no useful purpose.

The applicant challenged housing benefit decisions concerning his alleged liability to pay rent. In earlier judicial review proceedings, Mr Justice Richards quashed a Review Board decision because it confused Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992, section 130, with paragraph 7(1)(b) of the Housing Benefit (General) Regulations 1987, and failed adequately to consider the evidence.

The Board reconsidered the matter but rejected the claim again. In further judicial review proceedings, Mr Justice Stanley Burnton granted permission on the basis that the decision was inadequately reasoned. The Board then withdrew its decision and agreed to pay the applicant’s reasonable costs. The High Court stayed the proceedings. The issue before the Court of Appeal was whether that stay, and the continuation of remittal to the Board, were unlawful or otherwise wrong.

1. Permission refused. The stay ordered by Mr Justice Stanley Burnton was upheld.
2. Under CPR rule 3.1(2)(f), the court has power to stay proceedings without the parties’ consent. The fundamental principle identified by Potter LJ in Abraham v Thompson [1997] 4 All ER 363 was applicable, but did not prevent a stay where the claimant had secured all that the judicial review proceedings could provide.
3. The earlier judgment of Mr Justice Richards did not determine that the applicant had a genuine legal liability to pay rent. It established only that the Review Board had failed to consider the evidence adequately and had confused the statutory and regulatory provisions. The Board remained required to make the substantive decision lawfully.
4. Judicial review is directed to the decision-making process and reasoning. The court does not ordinarily decide the underlying housing benefit entitlement where Parliament has entrusted that decision to a specialist decision-maker.
5. CPR rule 54.19(3) may permit the court to determine the substance rather than remit the matter, but principally where only one substantive decision is possible and remittal would be futile. That was not this case. The Review Board could lawfully reach more than one outcome.
6. The applicant had obtained all that he could properly obtain from the proceedings because the impugned decision had been withdrawn and costs had been conceded. The application for permission to appeal was therefore dismissed.

• High Court, Administrative Court: Mr Justice Richards quashed an earlier Review Board decision and remitted the matter for reconsideration.
• High Court, Administrative Court: Mr Justice Stanley Burnton stayed the subsequent judicial review proceedings after the Board withdrew its decision and agreed to pay reasonable costs.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal was refused and the application was dismissed.