Camdon Group Ltd v Lamb

An appeal from an Employment Tribunal lies only on a question of law. The Employment Tribunal is the exclusive fact-finding body, and neither the Employment Appeal Tribunal nor the Court of Appeal may re-evaluate its factual findings unless an error in the governing law is shown. A different possible conclusion on the evidence, including evidence which was not called, does not establish an error of law. Permission to appeal should be refused where the proposed appeal has no real prospect of success on the permitted legal ground.

The Employment Tribunal upheld claims by Adrienne Lamb for unfair dismissal and sex discrimination. It found that she had contributed 100 per cent to her dismissal, so awarded no compensation for unfair dismissal, but awarded £2,832.50 for sex discrimination. The Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed the employer’s appeal on 26 April 2001, finding no error of law in the Tribunal’s decision to proceed without two proposed witnesses.

The employer applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal, challenging the procedure, the factual findings, and the application of the Employment Rights Act and the Sex Discrimination Act.

1. Application refused. The proposed appeal had no real prospect of success because it disclosed no arguable error of law. The Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction in an appeal from an Employment Tribunal was confined to questions of law. The relevant question was whether the Tribunal had misinterpreted the law governing its procedure or the applicable employment legislation.

2. The Employment Tribunal was the exclusive fact-finding body. The appellate courts could not embark on their own fact-finding or question factual conclusions merely because another Tribunal might have reached a different decision. The absence of two proposed witnesses, and the possibility that their oral evidence might have affected the result, did not itself amount to an error of law.

3. The Employment Tribunal was entitled to proceed with the hearing on 21 January 2000. It was entitled to assess the evidence that was presented, determine the facts, and apply the Employment Rights Act and the Sex Discrimination Act to those facts.

4. The unusual finding that the employee had contributed 100 per cent to her dismissal did not, without more, establish a legal contradiction invalidating the finding of unfair dismissal. Nor did the employer’s disagreement with the Tribunal’s inference of pregnancy-related sex discrimination raise a question of law.

Permission to appeal was therefore refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): application for permission to appeal refused.
• Employment Appeal Tribunal: on 26 April 2001, dismissed the employer’s appeal, holding that the Employment Tribunal had made no error of law in proceeding with the hearing.
• Employment Tribunal, Cardiff: on 21 January 2000, upheld claims of unfair dismissal and sex discrimination. No compensation was awarded for unfair dismissal because of 100 per cent contribution; £2,832.50 was awarded for sex discrimination.