Thornberry v Coleman

In slander proceedings, a trial judge may direct a jury to make one damages award for several slanders where they bear the same meaning. That choice is discretionary and is not an error of law. A conventional direction on aggravated damages is sufficient where it identifies conduct capable of increasing the injury, including an unfounded allegation and a false denial. An omission to remind the jury that comparative wealth is irrelevant may warrant criticism but will not justify appellate intervention without material impact. Damages are quintessentially for the jury. The Court of Appeal interferes only where the award is perverse, outside any reasonable range of response. A suggested judicial bracket is not binding, and limited publication and absence of lasting damage may justify a modest award.

The claimant brought slander proceedings against the defendant, alleging that she had called him a crook to fellow councillors on two occasions. After a trial before Mr Justice Gray and a jury, liability was found and damages of £1,000 were awarded. The award did not beat a payment into court, leading to a costs order that left the claimant substantially out of pocket. He renewed an application for permission to appeal, alleging errors in the summing-up on separate awards, aggravated damages and comparative wealth, and contending that the award was perverse. The central issue was whether any ground disclosed a real prospect of successfully challenging the directions or the jury’s assessment.

The renewed application for permission to appeal was refused.

1. The judge was entitled to direct the jury to return a single award for two slanders bearing the same meaning. That was within his jurisdiction and involved an exercise of discretion. There was no basis for appellate interference, particularly since the jury would understand that two slanders could attract more damages than one.
2. The direction on aggravated damages was adequate. The judge told the jury that they could increase damages where the defendant’s conduct aggravated or increased the original injury. He identified the unfounded allegation that the claimant was a crook and the defendant’s false denial as aggravating factors. That sufficiently addressed the matters relied upon, including the defendant’s persistence in denying the slanders. The judge was not required to refer expressly to the letter or to use the word spite.
3. The judge was open to criticism for failing to remind the jury that the parties’ comparative financial positions were irrelevant. That omission could not justify setting aside the award. The point had been described as small in submissions and was not raised after the summing-up and before the jury retired.
4. Assessment of damages in slander cases is principally for the jury. The Court of Appeal should interfere only where the award is perverse, in the sense that it falls outside any reasonable range of response. The judge’s bracket was only a suggested bracket. The jury was entitled to consider the limited publication and the absence of real or lasting damage. There was no real prospect of establishing perversity.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The claimant renewed his application for permission to appeal. Permission was refused.
2. High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division: After a trial before Mr Justice Gray and a jury, the claimant was awarded £1,000 in damages for slander. The award failed to beat a payment into court, resulting in the usual costs order.