Jindal, R (on the application of) v Birmingham City Council

Judicial review must be brought promptly from the date of the challenged decision and, in any event, within three months. Only the most exceptional circumstances justify a later application. Continuing negotiations do not determine when time begins. In compulsory purchase cases, failure to serve the true owner does not itself make the process a nullity; the objection should be pursued through the statutory appeal route. Property-right protection under Article 1 of Schedule 1, Part II does not circumvent the promptness requirement where the compulsory purchase is in the public interest.

Mr Hari Dev Jindal sought permission to appeal from Burton J’s order of 2 August 2001, which refused his renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review. He challenged Birmingham City Council’s compulsory acquisition of 486 City Road, Edgbaston. He argued that the compulsory purchase process was invalid because Hemcomp Ltd, said to be the true freehold owner, had not been served, and that time should not run while negotiations continued.

The compulsory purchase order was confirmed on 23 December 1999, the property vested in the council on 15 May 2000, and the judicial review application was filed on 13 March 2001. The central issues were timeliness, the effect of non-service on the statutory process, and whether property-right protection justified judicial review despite delay.

Lord Justice Tuckey refused permission to appeal. The application was out of time and there was no order for costs.

1. Promptness. Time for judicial review begins when the challenged decision is made. Proceedings must be brought promptly and in any event within three months. Only the most exceptional circumstances justify entertaining an application later. The end of negotiations is not determinative of the time limit. The limited evidence of continuing negotiations did not excuse the delay.
2. Statutory appeal. The objection that the compulsory purchase order had not been served on the true freehold owner was one which could and should have been raised by statutory appeal. The applicant and his company knew of the order during the six-week appeal period and had legal advice. Non-service did not render the entire compulsory purchase procedure invalid. Its validity had to be tested within the statutory procedure.
3. Property rights. The argument based on Article 1 of Schedule 1, Part II to the Human Rights Convention did not justify judicial review despite the delay. The compulsory purchase order was made in the public interest, to bring empty property back into use and proper repair, so the relevant exception applied.
4. The statutory right of appeal and its tight timetable reinforced the need for prompt challenges. Compulsory purchase affects property rights, and the procedure is intended to avoid prolonged uncertainty about ownership.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Lord Justice Tuckey refused permission to appeal and made no order for costs.
• High Court, Administrative Court: Burton J refused the renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review on 2 August 2001, principally because of delay.