In the matter of the Insolvency Act 1986: Re Frederick A Craggs

Permission for a second appeal requires more than a real prospect of success. The proposed appeal must raise an important point of principle or practice, or there must be another compelling reason for it to be heard. A compelling reason may arise where the lower courts’ decisions are plainly wrong and it would be unjust to let them stand. It does not arise merely because another judge might have reached a different conclusion or because the appeal is not fanciful. A litigant who had a fair opportunity to present evidence cannot ordinarily obtain a retrial by producing material that was not put before the courts below. Permission was therefore refused where neither procedural unfairness nor a plainly wrong evaluation of the evidence had been shown.

The applicant was adjudicated bankrupt in 1994 and automatically discharged in 1997. His trustee in bankruptcy later sought payment of £35,467.31, representing proceeds received by the applicant from the sale of land connected with a family trust and adjoining access land. The District Judge held that the proceeds were attributable to the applicant’s interest in the trust land and ordered payment.

His appeal to His Honour Judge Langan QC was dismissed on 31 July 2001. The applicant then sought permission for a second appeal, alleging that he had not received a fair opportunity to present his case and that the access strip should have been separately valued.

1. Application dismissed. Lord Justice Chadwick refused permission to bring a second appeal.
2. The court stated that the application was governed by CPR 52.13 and section 55(1) of the relevant 1999 legislation. Permission could be granted only if the proposed appeal raised an important point of principle or practice, or if there was another compelling reason for the appeal to be heard. A real, non-fanciful prospect of success was insufficient.
3. A plainly wrong decision which it would be unjust to allow to stand could amount to a compelling reason. The fact that another judge might have reached a different conclusion, or that the proposed appeal had some real prospect of success, did not satisfy that threshold.
4. The applicant had been directed to file the evidence and documents on which he relied. The evidence before the District Judge included statements from the applicant, his brother and the local authority. The Court of Appeal was not persuaded that the applicant had been denied a fair opportunity to present his case.
5. The applicant had not placed before either lower court the later valuation of the access strip, nor evidence that the parties had intended at the time of sale to apportion part of the proceeds to that strip. The later material did not demonstrate that the lower courts’ conclusions were plainly wrong. A retrial would therefore be inappropriate.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 23 November 2001, Lord Justice Chadwick dismissed the application for permission to bring a second appeal.
• High Court: His Honour Judge Langan QC dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the District Judge’s decision on 31 July 2001.
• County Court: District Judge Wood held that the applicant’s one-fifth share of the sale proceeds was attributable to property forming part of the bankruptcy estate and ordered payment of approximately £35,000.