Royal Bank Of Scotland v Sharma & Ors

A party who has freely agreed to a genuine consent order cannot appeal against that order. Any challenge must be pursued through the appropriate procedure for setting the order aside, rather than by reopening the compromised dispute on appeal. Exceptional delay requires a properly supported explanation, and vague medical evidence will not suffice. Article 6 does not prevent parties from compromising civil proceedings. The Human Rights Act 1998 could not apply retrospectively to events occurring before it came into force. Where a consent order remains effective, the appellate court will not investigate the underlying merits of the dispute.

The Royal Bank of Scotland brought possession proceedings against the appellants, who were mortgagees and related occupiers of the mortgaged property. After legal aid was withdrawn and a short adjournment was granted, the parties negotiated a consent order on 25 January 1995. The order provided for possession and stayed the bank’s proceedings, the counterclaim and related proceedings.

The first appellant later sought to set the order aside, alleging duress, undue influence and interference by the judge’s clerk. Those attempts failed. Fresh proceedings were struck out, and a Grepe v Loam order restricted further claims or applications without permission. The appellant then sought permission to appeal after substantial delay. The central issues were whether permission should be granted and whether the consent order could be challenged by appeal.

1. Application refused. The court refused consent under the Grepe v Loam order to seek to set aside the consent order and refused permission to appeal. There was no order for costs.
2. The order made by Robert Walker J was a true consent order. The judge had expressly satisfied himself that the appellant agreed to its terms. A party who has consented to such an order cannot appeal against it. The appellant’s previous attempt to set it aside and the subsequent fresh proceedings had also failed.
3. The delay from January 1995 was gross and was not adequately explained. The medical certificate relied on did not establish that the appellant had been unable to conduct his legal affairs or pursue an appeal during the relevant period. In any event, the court saw no prospect of a successful appeal.
4. The allegations that the judge had improperly influenced the appellant through his clerk were unsupported and were described as absurd. The allegation of an unfair hearing under Article 6 of the Convention had no substance. Parties are free to compromise civil disputes.
5. The Human Rights Act 1998 came into force after the consent order and could not operate retrospectively in relation to events in January 1995. The court also found no breach of Article 6 on the facts.
6. Because the dispute had been compromised by consent, the court would not examine the underlying merits of the possession claim or related proceedings.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The court refused permission to appeal and refused consent to pursue an application to set aside the consent order.
• Chancery Division: Robert Walker J made the consent order on 25 January 1995. An application to set it aside was dismissed. Later proceedings were struck out, and a restriction on further applications was imposed.