Tassell & Ors v President & Law Society

Permission for a second appeal requires an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to intervene, under rule 52.13 of the Civil Procedure Rules. That threshold applies even where the first-instance tribunal dismissed a case summarily and the first appellate court agreed. The general importance of complaints against solicitors does not convert a fact-dependent dispute into an important point of principle. Disciplinary allegations must also be stated with sufficient clarity to enable those accused to answer them properly. Where allegations are unsuitable for disciplinary determination, and no error by the tribunal is shown, permission may be refused.

The appellants sought permission to appeal from the Divisional Court’s decision of 24 July 2001. The Divisional Court had declined to allow an appeal concerning proceedings before the Solicitors’ Disciplinary Tribunal, in which allegations against solicitors and the appellants’ application concerning those allegations had been considered.

The appellants complained of professional misconduct said to have caused financial loss and argued that the summary nature of the Tribunal’s decision meant that the restrictions on a second appeal did not apply. The central issues were whether the proposed appeal satisfied the second-appeal permission threshold and whether the allegations were suitable for determination by the Tribunal.

Lord Justice Schiemann refused permission to appeal. There was no order for costs, and the transcript was to be supplied to the applicant at public expense.

1. Second-appeal threshold. The Court accepted that the application was a second appeal: the first appeal had been to the Divisional Court. Rule 52.13 of the Civil Procedure Rules therefore applied. The fact that the Tribunal had dealt with the matter summarily did not remove the application from the rule. Where a tribunal concludes that a case is without foundation and an appellate court reaches the same conclusion, the case falls within the rule’s wording.
2. Application of the threshold. The proposed appeal was fact-dependent and did not raise an important point of principle or practice. The importance of complaints against solicitors, while acknowledged, did not give every complainant a right to bring the matter before the full Court of Appeal.
3. Suitability of the disciplinary proceedings. Allegations against solicitors must be put in a crisp and clear form so that the persons accused have a proper opportunity to deal with them. The allegations advanced were not shown to be suitable for determination by the Tribunal, and the material did not suggest that the Tribunal had erred in dismissing the matter.
4. Alternative remedy. The Court did not determine whether the appellants had a monetary remedy or against whom. It indicated that any such remedy would be more appropriately pursued through proceedings directed to recovery of money than through disciplinary proceedings.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division). On 30 November 2001, Lord Justice Schiemann refused permission to appeal.
2. Divisional Court. On 24 July 2001, the court declined to allow an appeal concerning the decision of the Solicitors’ Disciplinary Tribunal.
3. Solicitors’ Disciplinary Tribunal. The Tribunal dismissed the appellants’ application concerning allegations made against solicitors in disciplinary proceedings.