Tee-Hillman v Heppenstalls (A Firm)

On an application for permission to appeal, the Court of Appeal will not re-evaluate a trial judge’s factual findings merely because the appellant advances a different account of the evidence. Where a contract for sale is followed by a transfer of the legal estate, the contract may assist in construing the transfer, but the beneficial interests are determined primarily by the true construction of the completed deed and the parties’ agreement. A transfer into joint names ordinarily carries the legal and beneficial interests jointly, unless evidence establishes a different trust. A failure to include a declaration of trust cannot cause actionable loss where the declaration would have recorded the same beneficial shares. Permission to appeal was refused because there was no realistic prospect of displacing the trial judge’s findings.

The claimant brought negligence and fraud proceedings against her former solicitors concerning the purchase of Gorse Meadow during her marriage. She alleged that the solicitors should have advised separate representation, recorded unequal beneficial interests, and included a declaration of trust in the transfer.

The claim was dismissed by His Honour Judge Bradbury in the Queen’s Bench Division. He found that the claimant and her former husband intended to own the property equally, that the solicitors had acted on joint instructions, and that the claimant knew the transaction was proceeding on that basis. The claimant applied out of time for permission to appeal, challenging those findings and the judge’s construction of the contract and transfer.

1. Application dismissed. Lord Justice Clarke held that the proposed appeal had no prospect of success. It was therefore unnecessary to decide separately whether time should be extended. There was no order for costs.
2. The trial judge was entitled to reject the claimant’s evidence and to find that she understood the instructions given to the solicitors. An appellate court which had not heard the evidence should not realistically be expected to substitute a different conclusion in the face of those findings.
3. The contract naming the claimant as purchaser was relevant evidence, but it was not determinative. Consistently with Leggott v Barrett [1880] 15 Ch 306, the contract could be used as an aid to construing the subsequent deed. The primary question was the true construction of the transfer itself.
4. On that construction, the transfer into the joint names of the claimant and her former husband vested both the legal and beneficial interests in them equally. The conclusion was consistent with the principle stated in Earl of Egmont v Smith [1877] 6 Ch 474, that a purchaser may direct how the property is to be conveyed.
5. The general presumption that transfer of the legal estate carries the beneficial interest with it may be displaced by evidence of an agreement or trust to the contrary, as recognised in Vandervell v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1966] 1 Ch 261. The evidence here established no agreement that the claimant should hold the property beneficially in her sole name.
6. Even if failing to include a declaration of trust had been negligent, it would not have assisted the claimant. On the findings, any declaration would have recorded equal beneficial ownership.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): application for permission to appeal from the final order of His Honour Judge Bradbury, sitting in the Queen’s Bench Division, dismissed. The claim had been dismissed and the claimant had been ordered to pay costs, with £25,000 payable on account.